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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
VERNON E. CLIFFORD, : Case No. 970681-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from judgment and conviction for carrying a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1995) , in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Joseph C. Fratto and the Honorable Michael K. Burton, 
Judges, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A 
(judgment). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's 
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an inventory 
search conducted in violation of his right against unreasonable 
search and seizure? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's factual findings that 
support a "decision that [an inventory search was] conducted in a 
constitutionally permissible manner are reviewed under the 
'clearly erroneous' standard, while the ultimate legal 
determination that the [inventory search] comported with the 
Fourth Amendment is reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App. 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant 
to the invalid inventory search is preserved in the record of the 
Motion To Suppress Hearing, July 29, 1997, for appeal ("R.") at 
3-44.x 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
determinative of the issue on appeal are as follows. Their text 
is provided in Addendum B. 
United States Const, amend. IV; 
Carrying Loaded Firearm In Vehicle, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-505 (1995). 
Impounded Vehicles - Seizure - Circumstances Where 
Permitted, Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101(1)(f)(i) (Supp. 
1998) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Vernon E. Clifford ("Clifford") was charged by 
information with carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 
1998). R.2-3. An arrest warrant was issued. R.4. The State 
amended the information, charging Appellant with carrying a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
1
 In the pleadings, the pages of the motion hearing 
transcript have not been paginated individually nor referenced by 
a page number on the cover. For purposes of this brief, 
information from the motion hearing will be referenced by the page 
number assigned in the transcribing process, preceded by "MH" 
(e.g., R. MH4) . Information from Clifford's change of plea hearing 
will be similarly referenced (e.g., R. PH 11). The remaining 
information shall be referenced by the page number provided in the 
pleadings (e.g., R.2). 
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of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505. R.9. 
At a pre-trial motion hearing, Clifford moved to suppress 
the gun seized pursuant to an inventory search of his vehicle on 
the basis that the State did not establish standardized 
procedures or that the officer adhered to them. R. MH12,36-40. 
Clifford alternatively challenged the evidence on the basis that 
the inventory search was an impermissible pretext to an 
investigation. R. MH36-40. The trial court denied Clifford's 
motion. R. MH40-43. 
Clifford entered a conditional guilty plea to the amended 
charge, reserving his right to appeal the conviction pursuant to 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). See also Utah R. 
Crim. P. ll(i) (1998). R.26-27. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At a pre-trial motion hearing, Officer James F. Blanton 
("Blanton") testified that at approximately 1:30 a.m. on January 
5, 1997, he observed a white pick-up truck with registration tags 
that had expired nine months earlier in March, 1996. R. MH6. 
Blanton initiated a traffic stop. Id. The truck pulled over 
without incident in the parking lot of a nearby bar. Id. 
Blanton testified that he approached the driver of the 
truck, Appellant Clifford, and inquired whether he knew why he 
had been stopped. R. MH7. Clifford responded that he was 
probably pulled over on account of the expired registration, and 
Blanton confirmed his suspicion. Id. Blanton asked Clifford for 
his licence, registration, and proof of insurance. Id. Clifford 
3 
produced his driver's license and the registration verifying that 
he was the owner of the vehicle. Id. Clifford was unable to 
provide proof of insurance. Id. 
Meanwhile, Blanton noticed that Clifford's passenger, 
sitting with Clifford in the cabin of the truck, smelled of 
alcohol. Id. Blanton asked Clifford if he had been drinking, to 
which Clifford responded, "no." Id. 
Blanton ordered Clifford to stay with his truck while he ran 
a warrants check on the license and registration. Id. Blanton 
verified that the registration had expired in March, 1996, and 
that there were no outstanding warrants for Clifford's arrest. 
R.8. Blanton also called for assistance to administer a field 
sobriety test on Clifford. Id. 
Blanton returned the registration and license to Clifford, 
but told Clifford to remain pending arrival of the field sobriety 
test unit. Id. Eventually, a test was administered to Clifford. 
Id. The testing officer indicated to Blanton that Clifford was 
safe to operate a vehicle and that he would not be arresting him 
for DUI. Id. 
At that point, Blanton issued Clifford citations for expired 
registration and no proof of insurance and informed him that the 
truck would be impounded. R. MH9. Blanton asked both Clifford 
and the passenger to exit the vehicle. Id. Blanton explained 
that the decision to impound is within his discretion and that he 
normally impounds only one-eighth (twelve percent) of the 
vehicles that he stops for expired registration. R. MH22,24. 
4 
However, if a vehicle's registration is exceedingly overdue, 
Blanton asserted that he would impound the car ninety-nine times 
out of a hundred. R. MH32. 
Without asking Clifford if there were any valuables in the 
truck, Blanton initiated an inventory search. Id. Blanton never 
looked in the glove box, behind the seats, under the hood or in 
the bed of the truck. R. MH25,27,34. Instead, Blanton began the 
search with the passenger side, looking under the seat and on the 
floor where he observed three open beer cans. R. MH11. Blanton 
then moved to the driver's side, where he located a holstered .45 
pistol in the pouch of the door. Id. Blanton alerted two other 
officers at the scene that a weapon was found. Id. Blanton 
unholstered the pistol, which was cocked and ready to shoot. 
R. MH11-12. Clifford spontaneously claimed ownership and warned 
Blanton to be careful since there was a bullet in the chamber. 
R. MH ll.2 Blanton then arrested Clifford for possession of a 
concealed weapon. R. MH17,28. 
Blanton testified that he filled out a state tax impound 
form contemporaneously with the search. R. MH10. Blanton listed 
the beer cans and the gun. R. MH25-28. He admitted, however, 
that he failed to note some tools that he found and that he 
aborted filling out the form when he found the gun. R. MH10, 
17,27. Blanton explained that another officer completed the 
2
 Clifford explained at his change of plea hearing that the 
gun was left in the truck accidentally after he and his wife had 
gone shooting a few days prior. R. PH 11. Clifford does not have 
any prior weapon convictions that would discredit his explanation. 
Id. 
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search, although he was not sure when or how that was done. Id. 
During direct examination, the State asked Blanton to 
explain the Sheriff Department's policy regarding inventory 
searches. R. MH12. Clifford objected under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 1002 (1998), the "best evidence rule." Id. Blanton 
testified during voir dire that the department's policy was in 
writing and that he followed it in conducting his search of 
Clifford's truck. R. MH14. On that basis, Clifford argued that 
the State was required to produce the writing itself in order to 
establish the policy. R. MH12,14. 
The State responded that absent the written policy, it would 
lay foundation through Blanton's testimony regarding his 
understanding of the policy. R. MH15. Clifford objected again, 
noting that Blanton's understanding is based on the written 
policy and therefore the State could not meet its burden under 
Rule 1002 through Blanton's testimony alone. Id. The trial 
court overruled Clifford's objection and allowed Blanton to 
testify as to his understanding of the policy. Id. 
Blanton explained that he received annual training regarding 
search and seizure, including state tax impounds. R. MH16. He 
explained that he has the discretion to impound a car with an 
expired registration of three months4 or more; that he is to 
inform the owner that the car is about to be impounded; and then 
he is to begin the inventory search of the vehicle. R. MH16. He 
also stated that, pursuant to department policy, he was supposed 
to list all items found during the inventory search. R. MH30. 
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Based on Blanton's testimony, the trial court found that 
Blanton had the authority to impound the car pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1101(1) (f) (i) (Supp. 1998) since Clifford's 
registration was nine months overdue. R. MH34,42. The court 
further found that the search was conducted pursuant to proper 
procedures and that Blanton's "purpose in searching was simply to 
make an inventory;" that Blanton found open containers, some 
tools, then the gun; and that Blanton began to fill out an 
inventory form. R. MH43. Having "found evidence of a crime" 
pursuant to a legally conducted inventory search, the trial court 
found that Blanton was reasonable in aborting the search and 
filling out the forms to arrest Clifford. R. MH43. The court 
concluded that "this was a proper search . . . done pursuant to 
statute and policy, and I would deny the motion to suppress the 
evidence." Id.; see Addendum C (motion hearing transcript). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in finding the inventory search valid 
and in subsequently denying Clifford's motion to suppress the 
gun. First, the State did not meet its burden to establish a 
standardized procedure for inventory searches and that Blanton 
complied with it in conducting the search on Clifford's truck. 
In addition, the search is invalid because it was conducted as a 
pretext to an investigative motive. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in finding the search constitutional and in failing to 
suppress the gun found as a result. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING CLIFFORD'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS THE GUN WHERE THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED 
IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to an individual 
who is detained during an automobile stop. See Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) 
(detention of individual during automobile stop for limited time 
and purpose constitutes "seizure" under Fourth Amendment). 
An inventory search of an automobile is an exception to the 
warrant requirement, and evidence properly seized thereto may be 
admitted at trial. See State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267-68 (Utah 
1985) (citing South Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 
3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 126 
(1983)) . As noted by this Court, 
Inventory searches of impounded vehicles' contents 
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement because 
such a search is not conducted to investigate criminal 
activity and no variant of individualized suspicion is 
necessary to permit one. Instead, police conduct such 
inventory searches to protect property in the car, to 
protect police against the claim of theft, and to protect 
police from potential danger. 
State v. Stricklincr, 844 P.2d at 986 (citing Qpperman, 428 U.S. 
at 369). 
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An inventory search is valid, i.e. reasonable, under the 
Fourth Amendment if: (1) the car was justifiably impounded3 and 
the search was conducted pursuant to standardized procedure, 
Hvah, 711 P.2d at 268-69; and (2) the search was not a "'pretext 
concealing an investigatory police motive.'" Hygh, 711 P.2d at 
268 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376) .4 The State bears the 
burden to establish that an inventory search meets these 
standards. Id. The State, however, failed to meet its burden in 
the this case. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding the 
search valid and in denying Clifford's motion to suppress the gun 
found as a result. 
A. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Establish Standard 
Procedure And That Officer Blanton Adhered To It In 
Conducting The Search. 
The trial court erred in denying Clifford's motion to 
3
 Clifford's car was justifiably impounded. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-la-1101 (1) (f) (i) (Supp. 1998) (permitting impound of 
vehicle with registration expired more than three months); see also 
Strickling, 844 P.2d at 986 (finding car justifiably impounded 
under statutory predecessor to Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-
1101(1) (f) (i)) . 
The Hygh Court set forth an analysis regarding the 
circumstances necessitating an impound not statutorily authorized. 
Since Blanton had statutory authorization here, the "necessity 
analysis" is not applicable. See Strickling, 844 P.2d at 986 n.4 
(court only looks to circumstances necessitating impound where 
statutory justification does not exist). 
4
 Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, like its 
Fourth Amendment counterpart, also guarantees that an individual 
shall be free of unreasonable search and seizure. Moreover, 
pursuant to Hygh, Article I, Section 14 guarantees must be 
protected in the context of inventory searches. 711 P.2d at 267. 
While the Utah Constitution is implicated in the instant case, 
Clifford does not offer an analysis under Article I, Section 14, 
and instead presents his discussion under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
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suppress where the State failed to meet its burden to establish 
standardized procedure and that Blanton adhered to it. See Hygh, 
711 P.2d at 268. First, the State did not present the written 
policy as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 1002. Moreover, 
Blanton7s testimony regarding the existence of a standard 
procedure was not adequate to meet the State's burden since it 
was not probative of the issue before the court and, in any 
event, demonstrated that Blanton did not follow it in conducting 
this search. 
1. Rule 1002 Requires The State To Produce The Written 
Manual In Order To Establish Procedure. 
In the instant case, the State sought to establish the 
Sheriff Department's standard procedure for inventory searches 
through Blanton's testimony. R. MH12. Clifford objected under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 1002 and requested that the court compel 
the State to produce the written policy.5 Id. Overruling the 
objection, the trial court erroneously allowed Blanton to testify 
to his understanding of the policy. R. MH15. 
Contrary to the court's ruling and pursuant to Rule 1002, 
however, the State was required to produce the written manual 
published by the Sheriff's Department and under which Blanton 
received his training and conducted the inventory search at issue 
here. 
Rule 1002, otherwise known as the "best evidence" or 
"original writing" rule, provides: 
5
 During voir dire, Clifford ascertained that a written 
policy existed under which Blanton was trained. R.MH13-14. 
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[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or 
photograph the original writing, recording, or photograph is 
required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by 
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by 
Statute.6 
The best evidence rule requires that an original writing be 
produced "where the thing to be proved is the contents of the 
writing," State v. Reay, 368 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 1962), or where 
secondary evidence, "by its nature, or expressly, indicates the 
existence of more accurate evidence." State v. Campbell, 208 
P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1949); see also Furniture Mfr. Sales, Inc. v. 
Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1984) (evidence of discharge in 
bankruptcy requires documentary proof; oral testimony is 
insufficient). Conversely, the best evidence rule "has no 
application to a case where a party seeks to prove a fact which 
has an existence independent of any writing." Roods v. Roods, 
645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982) (mother could testify to length of 
her pregnancy and State need not proffer medical record of 
gestation period). 
6
 The exceptions to Rule 1002 include: (1) Duplicates of 
originals are admissible where there is no question of authenticity 
of the original and where it would not be unfair to admit the 
duplicate in lieu of the original, (Utah R. Evid. 1003 (1998)) ; (2) 
Other evidence of contents of a writing are admissible where the 
original is lost, destroyed, not available, in the possession of 
the opponent, or where the writing is not closely related to a 
controlling issue, (Utah R. Evid. 1004 (1998)); (3) Certified 
copies of public records may be submitted in lieu of the originals, 
(Utah R. Evid. 1005 (1998)); (4) Summaries of voluminous writings 
that cannot be conveniently examined by court, and where originals 
or duplicates are made available for examination by other party at 
reasonable time or place, (Utah R. Evid. 1006 (1998)) ; Original not 
required where party against whom it is offered testifies to its 
content, (Utah R. Evid. 1007 (1998)) . The written policy at issue 
here does not fit within any of these exceptions. 
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The purpose of the best evidence rule is to prevent 
mistransmission of dispositive information and to ensure the 
accuracy of evidence contained in writings. McCormick et al., 
McCormick On Evidence § 231 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter 
"McCormick"]. The concerns underlying the rule are especially 
acute when, as in the instant case, the proponent of evidence 
contained in a writing seeks to introduce the evidence through a 
witness' recollection of the contents of the writing. Id. 
"[0]ral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a 
writing is probably subject to greater risk of error than oral 
testimony concerning other situations generally." Id. 
Without deciding the issue, this Court in Stricklincr, stated 
that "the State could not carry its burden if it could not 
produce a written policy in the face of a [best evidence] 
objection to an officer's testimony concerning written 
[inventory] policies." Id. at 990 n.12 (declining to decide the 
issue since defendant did not raise best evidence objection at 
trial)7. In light of the foregoing, and in the face of 
Clifford's best evidence challenge, the trial court erroneously 
refused to compel the State to produce the written policy 
outlining the procedure for inventory searches. 
First, Blanton expressly stated that a written policy did 
exist and that he was trained thereto. R. MH13-14. Where 
secondary evidence, "by its nature, or expressly, indicates the 
7
 Judge Orme reiterated this position during oral argument in 
State v. Montova, 937 P. 2d 145 (Utah App. 1997) . See Utah Ct. App. 
tape no. 134, counter nos. 690-748. 
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existence of more accurate evidence," the best evidence rule is 
implicated and the proponent must produce the written document, 
Campbell, 208 P.2d at 533. 
In addition, the content of the written inventory search 
policy is dispositive as to the validity of the search here since 
it identifies the procedure that Blanton was supposed to follow 
and, consequently, is the index by which the conformity of his 
actions are measured. Specifically, absent the written policy, 
the court lacked the information necessary to determine whether 
the inventory search was conducted legally, such as where Blanton 
should and should not have looked, to what extent Clifford should 
have been involved in the disposition of his belongings before 
Blanton initiated the search, how Blanton was supposed to handle 
items found during the search, and how he was to deal with the 
search after finding incriminating evidence. Where the written 
policy was so central to the suppression hearing, the trial court 
erred in allowing Blanton to testify to his understanding of it. 
See Utah R. Evid. 1002 (original writing must be produced where 
contents are at issue); Reav, 368 P.2d at 597 (best evidence rule 
applies where content of writing is thing to be proved); 
McCormick (where precise words are central to issue, original 
must be produced). 
The trial court's error is underscored given that the 
inventory search procedure is defined by and exists through the 
written policy. See, e.g., Roods, 645 P.2d at 642 (best evidence 
rule inapplicable where thing to be proved has existence 
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independent of writing). Inventory search jurisprudence provides 
that an inventory search is legal only to the extent that it is 
sufficiently regulated by a standard procedure. See Opperman, 
42 8 U.S. at 3 75 (directing that inventory search must be 
regulated by standard procedure); Hygh, 711 P.2d at 269-70 
(invalidating inventory search where officer did not act within 
parameters of policy). Where a policy does not exist, the search 
is per se invalid. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5, 
110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (affirming suppression order 
where "Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatever with respect 
to opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory 
search"). Accordingly, where the inventory search at issue here 
is given legitimacy by virtue of a written procedure, the State 
was required to produce the written policy under the best 
evidence rule. 
In allowing Blanton to testify to his understanding of the 
procedure the trial court risked that dispositive information 
would be mistransmitted. See McCormick § 231. As noted by 
McCormick et al., human recall is not full proof and may present 
even "greater risk of error" when relied upon to relate the terms 
of a writing. Id. In addition to the shortcomings of human 
memory in general, Blanton as the searching officer and agent of 
the government had an interest in relating his understanding of 
the policy in a light favorable to his actions. Id. (noting the 
possibility that witness testimony may inadvertently or 
purposefully distort terms of writing). Admission of the written 
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policy, as required by Rule 1002, would have alleviated these 
concerns. 
In light of the foregoing, the best evidence rule was 
implicated, requiring the State to produce the written procedure 
followed by Blanton in conducting the inventory search. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in allowing Blanton to testify 
to his understanding of the policy and risking mistransmission of 
vital evidence. 
2. Even Assuming Rule 1002 Does Not Require The Written 
Policy, The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Where Blanton's 
Testimony Did Not Demonstrate Certain Knowledge Of The 
Written Procedure And Did Not Adequately Establish That 
He Adhered To It In Conducting The Inventory Search. 
Even assuming that Rule 1002 is not applicable in this case, 
the State still failed to meet its burden to establish 
standardized procedure and that Blanton followed it in conducting 
the inventory search of Clifford's truck. 
Where the evidence regarding the existence of standard 
procedure comes solely from the testimony of the searching 
officer, that testimony must demonstrate a "certain knowledge11 
and be "probative" of such procedure. Strickling, 844 P.2d at 
990. As in the case at bar, Strickling involved a situation 
where the only evidence concerning standard inventory search 
procedure came from the testimony of the searching officer. Id. 
at 989. On direct examination, the officer in Strickling 
explained that a "vehicle will be searched completely. The 
search will include but not be limited to the trunk, locked 
portions of the vehicle, locked cases, et cetera." Id. at 988. 
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The officer also testified that he followed the procedure, did 
not deviate from it, and did not interrupt the search when he 
found incriminating evidence. Id. 
This Court held that the officer's testimony was adequate, 
absent a Rule 1002 challenge, because he 
testified that he had significant experience with 
impoundments; that departmental policy required an inventory 
search of all impounded vehicles; that such searches were to 
extend to all areas of the vehicle, including the opening of 
locked containers; and that he followed these procedures. 
Furthermore, he responded to several questions on cross-
examination by referring to normal departmental practice. 
His testimony demonstrated [] certain knowledge . . . [and 
was] probative of standardized policies. 
Id. at 990, n.12. 
Blanton's testimony is distinguishable because it is not as 
extensive or detailed and, therefore, not sufficiently probative 
of standardized procedure. For example, on direct examination, 
Blanton testified that he was trained in the state tax impound 
policy and procedure at annual mandatory search and seizure 
classes, R. MH 15-16; that he can impound a vehicle with a 
registration expired more than three months, R. MH 16; and that 
he must inform the driver that the car will be impounded before 
he can begin an inventory search. Id. On cross-examination, 
Blanton explained further that he is supposed to list all the 
items he finds on an inventory form. R. MH 30. Blanton also 
made a general statement that there is a standard policy 
regarding closed containers and contraband, but did not explain 
what the procedure was. Id. Finally, Blanton admitted that 
"when [he] do[es] an inventory search, most of it is left up to 
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[his] discretion without a procedure." R. MH 31. 
Unlike the officer's detailed testimony in Stricklinq, 
Blanton essentially testified that he was authorized to impound 
the car due to the expired registration and that there is a 
standard procedure that he followed in the ensuing search. 
Blanton7s testimony is very general and does not offer the sort 
of detail as to inventory search procedure that would allow the 
court to determine whether the search was conducted in a 
constitutionally valid manner. Without this necessary 
information, the trial court could not assess Blanton's 
"compliance with or departure from" the procedure of the 
Sheriff's Department, and hence, the validity of the search. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138 (Utah 1994). 
Even assuming that the State did meet its burden to 
establish standard procedure through Blanton's testimony, it 
still failed to establish that Blanton adhered to it in 
conducting the search. The only evidence that Blanton adhered to 
standard procedure is his own testimony that he followed the 
rules as he understood them. R. MH 14-19. As noted above, 
Blanton's memory of the policy presented a risk of 
mistransmitting vital information, which was, in turn, 
exacerbated by Blanton's interest in relating the policy in a 
light favorable to his actions. See supra Point I.A.I. 
Moreover, the State did not produce any other objective evidence 
that would alleviate the concerns regarding mistransmitted or 
biased information, such as a completed inventory form, R. MH 19, 
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or the Sheriff's Department's written policy for inventory 
searches. R. MH15. Accordingly, the State did not present 
competent evidence that would establish Blanton's compliance with 
inventory search procedure. 
In addition, Blanton admitted that he did not conduct a 
complete inventory search. For example, Blanton testified that 
he did not list all items he found during the search on an 
inventory form even though policy requires him to do so. 
R. MH26-27,30; see also Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270 (invalidating 
inventory search where officer did not list items found). He 
also testified that he did not note the truck's condition and 
failed to look in easily-seen areas of the truck, such as the 
bed, behind the seat, and in the glove compartment where 
valuables are likely to be kept, R. MH27,34, and instead focused 
on discrete areas of the truck where contraband is 
characteristically stashed. R. MH 29,34; see Hygh, 711 P.2d at 
270 (officer failed to look in all areas of impounded vehicle); 
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372 ("inventories often include examination 
of the glove compartment"). Finally, Blanton testified that he 
interupted the search when he discovered the incriminating items 
and allowed another officer to complete the search. R. MH10, 
17,27. 
In light of such a paucity of information regarding the 
existence and parameters of a standardized procedure, plus 
Blanton's admitted and demonstrated failure to comply with such 
policy, the State failed to meet its burden to establish that 
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this was a valid inventory search. Hence, the trial court erred 
in finding the inventory search valid and in denying Clifford's 
motion to suppress the gun found as a result. 
B. The Search Is Invalid Because It Was An Unconstitutional 
Pretext To An Investigatory Motive. 
The inventory search at issue here is additionally invalid 
because it was conducted as a pretext to an investigation for 
incriminating evidence. 
Under Hycrh, an inventory search is invalid if it is 
conducted as a "'pretext concealing an investigatory police 
motive.,n 711 P.2d at 268 (quoting Qpperman, 428 U.S. at 376). 
In invalidating the inventory search in that case, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that "[f]undamental constitutional guarantees 
against unreasonable searches cannot be evaded by labeling them 
'inventory searches.'" Id. 
The United States Supreme Court has also indicated in 
numerous opinions that an "inventory search must not be a ruse 
for a general rummaging." Wells, 495 U.S. at 3 (1990) 
(invalidating inventory search where police procedure did not 
allow for opening of locked suitcase); see also Qpperman, 428 
U.S. at 376 (upholding validity of inventory search that was not 
a pretext to police investigation); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 
367, 376, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (upholding 
inventory search where there was no evidence that it was 
conducted in bad faith). 
In Lopez, the Utah Supreme Court abolished the pretext 
doctrine in the context of investigatory searches valid under 
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 
(1968)8. Id. at 1135 (stop and search permissible upon 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause regardless of officer's 
subjective motivation). The United States Supreme Court 
similarly declined to apply the pretext doctrine in the case of 
searches otherwise validated by probable cause. See Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 
(1996) (traffic stop grounded in probable cause will not be 
invalidated by actual motivations of searching officer). 
However, both the Lopez and Whren decisions left open the 
possibility that a pretext analysis applies in the context of 
inventory searches. For example, the Lopez Court, citing its 
prior Hygh decision invalidating a pretextual inventory search, 
stated, "[o]ur decision today should not be interpreted to mean 
that evidence of an officer's's subjective intent or departure 
from standard police practice is never relevant to the 
determination of Fourth Amendment claims." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1138. 
The United States Supreme Court in Whren likewise noted 
8
 Terry requires a stop to be justified at its inception by 
probable cause to believe that an offense occurred or reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See 392 U.S. at 19-20; 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) . Also, the ensuing 
detention may "'last no longer than necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop,'" i.e. to confirm that the vehicle operator 
was licensed, entitled to use the car, and, if necessary, to dispel 
suspicion of further criminal activity that may arise as a result 
of the stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132-33, 1135 (quoting Florida v. 
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); 
citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 1879, State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 
(Utah 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 
1990)) . 
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several of its prior decisions where it stated that an 
11
' inventory search must not be used for a general rummaging in 
order to discover incriminating evidence.711 Id. at 1773 (quoting 
Wells, 495 U.S. at 4; citing Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (finding 
inventory search valid where there was "no showing that the 
police, who were following standard procedures, acted in bad 
faith or for the sole purpose of investigation"); New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 
(1987) (upholding warrantless administrative inspection that did 
not appear pretextual)); see also Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376 
(noting inventory search did not appear pretextual in finding it 
valid). 
With this body of case law in mind, the Whren Court 
distinguished its own holding to allow for the application of the 
pretext doctrine to inventory searches: 
[0]nly an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as 
endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate 
police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable 
cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. In 
each case we were addressing the validity of a search 
conducted in the absence of probable cause. Our quoted 
statements simply explain the exemption from the need for 
probable cause (and warrant), which is not accorded to 
searches that are not made for those purposes. 
Id. (emphasis original). Where Lopez and Whren distinguished 
their holdings from investigations otherwise validated by 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion pursuant to Terry, the 
pretext doctrine is preserved in the context of inventory 
searches, distinctive because they are not supported by probable 
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cause.9 Hence, an officer's subjective motivations may serve to 
9
 Indeed, the probable cause distinction renders the pretext 
doctrine indispensable to inventory search jurisprudence if an 
individual's rights are to be protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
Lopez explains that the critical difference necessitating the 
protections of pretext doctrine in the arena of inventory searches 
is that jurisprudence regarding investigative searches already 
incorporates analysis of "reasonableness" factors that provide a 
check on unconstrained discretion. 873 P.2d at 1135. 
[Ejxisting Fourth Amendment law precludes an officer from 
extending the length or scope of a traffic stop to investigate 
a suspicion of wrongdoing which does not rise to the level of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In light of this 
safeguard, . . . "the pretext doctrine adds little if 
anything" to existing Fourth Amendment protections. 
Id. (quoting State's appellate brief). 
Inventory search jurisprudence absent the pretext doctrine, on 
the other hand, falls short of guarding against "standardless and 
unconstrained discretion." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661; see also 
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 661 (identifying "standardless and 
unconstrained discretion" as the "evil" to be wary of with regard 
to inventory searches). Without the pretext doctrine, there is 
nothing in inventory search jurisprudence akin to the probable 
cause / reasonable suspicion analysis that protects against 
unfettered discretion. Inventory search law standing alone only 
guards against unconstitutional search motivations after the 
officer has gained access to car and to the extent that the officer 
is constrained to follow a standardized set of procedures. See 
Strickling, 844 P. 2d at 987-88 ("regularized set of procedures 
guards against arbitrariness when police conduct warrantless 
inventory searches"); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 383 (searches conducted 
under standard procedures avoid "danger of hindsight 
justification") (Powell, J., concurring). Even then, protection 
against unfettered discretion is limited since the scope of the 
inventory search is virtually unconstrained so long as it is 
authorized by department policy, written or unwritten. See, e.g., 
Illinois v. Lafavettef 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 
L.Ed.2d 65 1983) (upholding inventory search conducted pursuant to 
established routine); Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375 (upholding search 
conducted pursuant to standardized police procedure). 
In sum, there is nothing to prevent an officer from using an 
inventory search as a ruse to gain access to an area otherwise 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. The pretext doctrine is a 
necessary component of inventory search law since it provides the 
added layer of protection necessary to ensure that the officer does 
not act on an unconstitutional hunch and use an inventory search to 
gain access to the car in violation of a defendant's rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
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invalidate an inventory search.10 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in finding 
that the stop was not conducted pretextually where the evidence 
suggests otherwise. In holding that the inventory search was not 
pretextual, the trial court found that Deputy Blanton had 
statutory authorization to impound the car, R. MH 42; that 
Blanton conducted the search in conformance with standard 
procedure to the extent that he noted the open containers and the 
gun, R. MH 43; that Blanton acted reasonably in interrupting his 
search to arrest Clifford after discovery of the gun and in 
allowing another officer to complete the search. Id. Given the 
findings, the trial court erred in denying Clifford's suppression 
order where other evidence, not accounted for by the court, 
evinces Blanton's unconstitutional, investigatory motive which is 
apparent from the earliest stages of the events leading up to the 
impound.X1 
For example, Blanton did not immediately decide to impound 
the vehicle upon verifying Clifford's expired registration, but 
rather waited until after he exhausted other possible means of 
10
 A number of post-Whren decisions from other jurisdictions 
have likewise preserved the pretext doctrine with regard to 
inventory searches while abolishing it as to investigative 
searches. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Minn. 
1997) (invalidating pretextual inventory search, citing Whren's 
exception of inventory searches from its own holding); State v. 
Martin, 1997 WL 705472 *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (upholding inventory 
search in part because in was not pretextual); Perry v. State, 933 
S.W.2d 249, 251 (Texas Ct. App. 1996) (same). 
11
 Reviewing courts look to the totality of the circumstances 
in determining whether an inventory search was an impermissible 
pretext to an investigation. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375. 
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discovering incriminating evidence. Specifically, Blanton 
testified that after he stopped Clifford for an expired 
registration, he ran a warrants and license check on Clifford, 
which proved to be "clean." R. MH 7-8. Blanton then only 
informed Clifford that he would be cited for lack of insurance 
proof and expired registration; he did not actually cite Clifford 
or inform him that he would be impounding the car until later. 
R. MH8-9. 
Next, Blanton told Clifford to stand by until a field 
sobriety test team arrived. R. MH8. Clifford passed the tests 
and was pronounced fit to drive by another officer. Id. Even 
though he tested clean for alcohol, Blanton admitted that he 
still suspected Clifford of being under the influence of alcohol. 
R. MH 21. At this point, Blanton cited Clifford and informed him 
that he would impound his vehicle for expired registration. 
R. MH9. The dubious coincidence between Blanton's unfounded 
suspicion that Clifford was under the influence and his decision 
to impound Clifford's truck raises questions as to the legitimacy 
of the alleged inventory search. 
The pretextual motive in this case is underscored given that 
Blanton did not ask Clifford if there were valuables in his truck 
or afford him the opportunity to dispense with those valuables 
prior to initiating the search. R. MH24-25. In Hygh, the 
Supreme Court found an inventory search to be pretextual, in 
part, because the officer failed to "involve the owner of the 
vehicle, who was present," in the disposition of the valuables in 
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his car. 711 P.2d at 270; see also State v. Cole, 674 P.2d at 
123 (inventory search valid in part where officer gave defendant 
opportunity to remove his valuables from car prior to initiating 
inventory search); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375 (noting inventory 
was reasonable partially because owner was not available to "make 
other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings"). 
As in Hygh, it is apparent from the facts of this case that 
Clifford could have disposed of his own belongings if Blanton had 
allowed him to do so. Blanton testified that a cell phone was 
found on Clifford after he was arrested. R. MH 31. Moreover, 
Clifford was not under arrest until the gun was found. R. MH27-
28. Hence, Clifford was at liberty before the search was 
conducted to call a friend or family member on his cell phone to 
come secure the tools and any other valuables in the truck. 
Instead, Blanton only informed Clifford that his car would be 
impounded and then promptly initiated the search. R. MH24-25. 
Blanton's haste to get the search underway undercuts the trial 
court's finding that the search was not pretextual.12 R. MH43. 
In addition, Blanton did not conduct a complete inventory 
search, nor did he adhere to standardized procedure. 
11
 [C] ompliance with or departure from police department procedures 
12
 Clifford acknowledges that a search is not rendered 
unreasonable simply because there were less intrusive means of 
securing his valuables in the truck. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 
647. Nonetheless, the fact that Blanton did not afford Clifford 
the opportunity to make other arrangements for the valuables in his 
truck, under the totality of the circumstances, undermines 
Blanton's claim that he merely sought to impound the vehicle for 
state tax purposes and not to look for incriminating items. 
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is particularly relevant in determining whether an officer 
conducted the inventory search pretextually." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1138; see also Hygh, 711 P.2d at 269-70 (noting in particular 
officer's failure to list items or search entire car in holding 
inventory search pretextual); Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5 (search 
conducted without sufficient criteria presents danger that it was 
conducted in bad faith) .13 
For example, Blanton testified that he is required to list 
all items found during an inventory search, yet admitted to not 
listing tools found in Clifford's truck. R. MH 10,29-30. 
Blanton stated that he started on the passenger side of the 
truck, finding open beer cans on the floor, which he 
contemporaneously indicated on his police report and a State 
impound tax form. R. MH 11. He then found the tools on the 
seat. R. MH26. He did not list the tools, but instead proceeded 
to the driver's side where he located the pistol in the door 
pouch. R. MH 11,26. Like the beer cans, Blanton noted the gun 
in the police report and on the tax form. R. MH26. 
If Blanton's intentions were sincere about taking an 
inventory for the sake of protecting Clifford's property and 
guarding the Sheriff's Department against false claims, R. MH 26-
13
 As discussed supra Point I.A., the State failed to meet its 
burden to establish standardized procedure and that Blanton adhered 
to it in conducting the inventory search of Clifford's truck. 
Consequently, it is difficult to assess to what extent Blanton 
adhered to the policy in carrying out this search. Id. However, 
to the extent that the State may have established the procedure 
that Blanton was supposed to follow, the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing belies Blanton's assertion that he carried out 
the search only to inventory the vehicle. 
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27, he would have listed the tools that he found in between 
finding the other incriminating items.14 See State v. Giron, 
943 P. 2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1997) (affirming suppression order 
based in part on trial court's finding that officer did not 
"contemporaneously record" items found during inventory search). 
However, Blanton's failure to list all the items found in 
Clifford's truck undermines the legitimacy of the search in this 
case.15 Id.; see also Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270 (invalidating 
inventory search as pretextual in part where officer did not list 
any items found). 
The fact that Blanton did not note the condition of the 
truck and overlooked easily seen areas of the truck, such as in 
the bed, behind the seats or in the glove compartment, where 
valuables are likely to be kept, further undermines the 
legitimacy of this search. R. MH27,29,34; see Opperman, 428 U.S. 
14
 To this end, common sense would also dictate that Blanton 
would have noted the truck's condition in order to guard against a 
claim that the body was damaged during the impound period. 
However, Blanton testified that he did not note the vehicle's 
condit ion. R.MH2 9. 
15
 Blanton, in explanation of his admitted failure to list the 
tools, stated that once he found the beer cans, there was an 
urgency to look for other open containers or dangerous weapons. R. 
MH 32. Consequently, he did not have time to list the tools that 
he found after the beer cans but before the gun. Id. 
Despite Blanton's claim, the "exigencies" of this situation 
did not dispense with the need to conduct the search according to 
standard procedure. Blanton did not indicate that Clifford was 
behaving in an uncooperative or threatening manner where it might 
be legitimately assumed that he would hurt someone with items yet 
undiscovered in the truck. Rather, Blanton testified that Clifford 
exited the truck and sat on a nearby wall without incident during 
the search. R.MH6-9,11. Under the circumstances, therefore, 
Blanton's explanation is disingenuous and his failure to follow 
procedure inexcusable. 
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at 3 72 ("standard inventories often include . . . glove 
compartment, since it is a customary place for documents of 
ownership and registration, [] as well as a place for the 
temporary storage of valuables") (citation omitted). Instead, 
Blanton focused on areas where contraband would typically be 
stashed, such as under the passenger's seat and in the pocket of 
the driver's door. R. MH11. 
Blanton's suspect selection of areas to search is 
underscored by the fact that he began his search on the 
passenger's side. R. MH 11. Clifford's passenger presented a 
greater chance of having contraband since, according to Blanton's 
testimony, he was drunk and smelled of alcohol. R. MH7-8. In 
fact, Blanton patted the passenger down for weapons, but did not 
do the same with Clifford. R. MH9. Hence, Blanton decided to 
begin the search in the suspect passenger's area. 
Finally, the fact that Blanton interrupted the search at the 
exact time that the gun was found raises more doubt that the 
search was not pretextual. Blanton testified that once he found 
the gun, it became his duty to apprehend and secure Clifford. 
R. MH27-28. Therefore, according to Blanton, he was not able to 
complete the inventory search and so another officer at the scene 
completed the task. R. MH18,33. 
Although the trial court found that Blanton was reasonable 
in interrupting the search upon discovery of the gun, R. MH 43, 
this does not preclude the possibility that Blanton could have 
seen the search through to its end while Clifford was in the 
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custody of one of the other officers at the scene.16 The fact 
that he did not continue the search when it was within his means 
to do so indicates that it was his sole purpose to find 
incriminating evidence, ceasing the search once he accomplished 
his goal. Blanton's pretextual motive is further highlighted 
given that he did not take notice of whether the "inventory" was 
actually completed by the other officer. R. MH 18. 
The sum of the foregoing evidence indicates that the 
inventory search was pretextual. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in holding that the search of Clifford's truck was not 
invalid as an unconstitutional pretext to an investigatory 
motive. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Clifford respectfully requests this 
court to reverse the trial court's order admitting the illegally 
seized gun as evidence, reverse the judgment of conviction, and 
remand the case to allow Clifford to withdraw his guilty plea. 
SUBMITTED this <£/xU: day of September, 1998. 
-* CATHERINE L. BEGIC / 
* /2i * * * ^ Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
16
 The trial court implicitly acknowledged this when it stated 
that the law did not prescribe a "certain way" for officer's 
conducting inventory searches to handle this situation. R. MH 43. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT L\kE COUNTY MURRAY DFPARTMENT 
5022 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
State of Utah MUITQV Citv 
Plaintiff Counter No 
Tape ^H-S&J 
JSk fMM-
Defem 
CRIMINAL JLDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case No 4?/n0&2'7 
Uj^&wy 
\PPEARANCES/PLE4 
The abo\e entitled yase came on for arraignment pre-tnal/tnal/preliminarv heanng before the Honj 
—*—l^ni^ftL JiKtee of the above entitled court on the £^ da> ot 
19<£/ Plaintiff was represented bv ////! A fftftTX/) " ^ HDisl t Attorney 
• Murray City Attorney 
K} The defendant appeared m person and was^as nonrepresented by as counsel 
• The defendant failed to appeal and the Court finding that the defendant had received proper notice of me tnal date and had 
voluntarily absented himself therefrom the tnal is ordered to proceed in absentia 
• The defendant entered his plea of guilty to the following charge(s) 
Countl Count II 
Count III Count IV 
JUDGMEN T 
After heanng the evidence in the matter and taking into consideration the arguments of the parties the Court finds the 
following f ll i  A tt . 
M Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed ( ^ TVV^  ft/Y\ dJ^ljA U^fr^f^ Amended to uM&W 
() Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed i ( ) Amended to \J) kdjjt 
( ) Guiltv ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed 
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed . 
( ) Guiltv ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed . 
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guiltv ( ) Dismissed . 
( ) Amended to _ 
( ) Amended to . 
( ) Amended to _ 
I ) Amended t o . 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
On^he c^zr/~ dav of 
\Z- ^xffi Impnsoned in the 
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ADDENDUM B 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle, on 
street, or in prohibited area. 
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not 
tarry a loaded firearm: 
(a) in or on a vehicle; 
(b) on any public street; or 
(c) in a posted prohibited area. 
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor. 
41-la-1101, Seizure — Circumstances where permitted — 
Impound lot standards. 
(1) The division or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor: 
(a) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been 
stolen; 
(b) on which any identification number has been defaced, altered, or 
obliterated; 
(c) that has been abandoned on the public highways; 
(d) for which the applicant has written a check for registration or title 
fees that has not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paid 
within 30 days; 
(e) that is placed on the water with improper registration; or 
(f) that is being operated on a highway: 
(i) with registration that has been expired for more than three 
months; 
(ii) having never been properly registered by the current owner; or 
(iii) with registration that is suspended or revoked. 
(2) If necessary for the transportation of a seized vessel, the vessel's trailer 
may be seized to transport and store the vessel. 
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking possession of a vehicle, vessel, or 
outboard motor under this section shall immediately notify the division of the 
action. 
(4) A vehicle or vessel seized under this section shall be moved by a peace 
officer or by a tow truck that meets the standards established: 
(a) by the Department of Public Safety under Subsection 41-6-102(4)(b); 
and 
(b) under Title 72, Chapter 9, Motor Carrier Safety Act. 
(5) (a) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the commission shall make rules setting standards for 
public garages, impound lots, and impound yards that may be used by 
peace officers and the division. 
(b) The standards shall be equitable, reasonable, and unrestrictive as to 
the number of public garages, impound lots, or impound yards per 
geographical area. 
(6) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (6)(b), a person may not 
operate or allow to be operated a vehicle stored in a public garage, 
impound lot, or impound yard regulated under this part without prior 
written permission of the owner of the vehicle. 
(b) Incidental and necessary operation of a vehicle to move the vehicle 
from one parking space to another within the facility and that is necessary 
for the normal management of the facility is not prohibited under this 
Subsection (6)(a). 
(7) A person who violates the provisions of Subsection (6) is guilty of a class 
C misdemeanor. 
(8) The division or the peace officer who seizes a vehicle shall record the 
mileage shown on the vehicle's odometer at the time of seizure, if: 
(a) the vehicle is equipped with an odometer; and 
(b) the odometer reading is accessible to the division or the peace officer. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
VS. 
VERNON E. CLIFFORD, 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
*** 
CASE NO. 971000627MS 
JUDGE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
TRANSCRIPTION OF MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS HEARING 
*•* 
TRANSCRIPTION OF THE ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS HEARING, HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE MICHAEL K. 
BURTON ON THE 29TH DAY OF JULY, 1997, BY VICKI R. BOS, A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF U T A H F | ! E L D 
FEB 2 4 1398 
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THE 
PERSON HERE, AND 
MR. 
HONOR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
FORD. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
COURT: WELL, LET'S SEE, THERE'S ONLY ONE 
I EXPECTED MORE. SO WHO IS THIS PERSON? 
NIELSEN: THIS IS MR. VERNON CLIFFORD, YOUR 
COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
NIELSEN: (INAUDIBLE.) 
COURT: SO I GUESS WE CAN DO VERNON CLIF-
YOUR TURN, I GUESS. 
MS. MANN: I GUESS SO. YOUR HONOR, THE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL HAS FILED A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, THEREBY 
PUTTING THE BURDEN ON THE STATE TO PROVE THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS 
SEIZED LEGALLY. 
THE 
MS. 
PUT THE EVIDENCE 
THE 
MS. 
BLANTON. 
THE 
COURT: OKAY. 
MANN: BASED ON THAT, WE'LL GO AHEAD AND 
ON. 
COURT: THANKS A LOT. 
MANN: THE STATE CALLS DEPUTY JAMES 
COURT: NOW, HAVE YOU FILED LIKE A LITTLE 
MOTION OR SOMETHING? 
MR. 
MS. 
THE 
NIELSEN: YES, THERE WAS ONE FILED. 
MANN: IT'S VERY LITTLE. 
COURT: OKAY. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
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21 
22 
23 
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MR. NIELSEN: IT'S SO LITTLE WE CAN'T . . . 
THE COURT: I MEAN, I SHOW YOUR APPEARANCE AND 
YOUR REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, BUT JUST THUMB -- THUMBING THROUGH 
HERE I DIDN'T SEE YOUR --
MR. NIELSEN: DID YOU RECEIVE (INAUDIBLE)? 
THE COURT: -- MOTION. 
MS. MANN: UH-HUH. (AFFIRMATIVE.) I RECEIVED 
A COPY OF IT. 
THE COURT: WHAT'S THE ESSENCE OF IT? 
MS. MANN: YOUR HONOR, WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE MY 
COPY? 
MR. NIELSEN: HERE'S ONE FOR YOU. 
THE COURT: I JUST KIND OF WANT TO BE UP TO 
SPEED WITH IT. 
DO YOU WANT TO SWEAR HIM IN? 
INIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (INAUDIBLE.) 
THE COURT: DO YOU? 
DEPUTY JAMES F. BLANTON. 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY THE STATE, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS 
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. MANN: 
Q PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND SPELL YOUR LAST NAME 
FOR THE RECORD. 
A JAMES F. BLANTON, JR.: B-L-A-N-T-O-N. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
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1 Q BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED? 
2 A SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE. 
3 Q AND HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN SO EMPLOYED? 
4 A APPROXIMATELY THREE YEARS. 
5 Q WHAT ARE YOUR DUTIES AT THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
6 SHERIFF'S OFFICE? 
7 A UH, RIGHT NOW MY PRESENT DUTIES ARE ASSIGNED TO 
8 SPECIAL OPERATIONS, MOTORS SQUAD, ENFORCING TRAFFIC VIOLA-
9 TIONS, AND ACCIDENTS. 
10 Q WERE YOU EMPLOYED BY THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ON 
11 JANUARY 5TH OF 1997? 
12 A I WAS. 
13 Q AND WHAT CLASSES OR QUALIFICATIONS DO YOU HAVE TO 
14 BE A SHERIFF'S DEPUTY? 
15 A I SPENT THREE MONTHS AT UTAH P.O.S.T. ACADEMY ON 
16 APPROXIMATELY 46TH AND 27TH, UH, NUMEROUS TRAINING HOURS 
17 THROUGHOUT THE YEARS ON PRETTY MUCH ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT --
18 Q OKAY. 
19 A -- DUTIES. 
20 Q DO YOU RECALL JANUARY 5TH OF 1997; APPROXIMATELY 
21 1:26? THAT WOULD BE A.M. 
22 A I DO. 
23 Q AND WHAT WERE YOUR DUTIES AT THAT TIME? 
24 A I WAS ASSIGNED TO EAST PATROL DIVISION AS A 
25 DEPUTY SHERIFF JUST TAKING DETAILS; CALLS FOR SERVICE. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
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Q 
VEHICLE AT 
A 
Q 
A 
COLOR. 
Q 
A 
AND WAS YOUR ATTENTION BROUGHT TO A CERTAIN 
THAT TIME? 
IT WAS. 
WHAT VEHICLE WAS THAT? 
UH, IT WAS A 1992 CHEVY PICKUP TRUCK; WHITE IN 
AND WHAT BROUGHT YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS VEHICLE? 
WHILE SITTING BEHIND THE VEHICLE AT A LIGHT I 
OBSERVED THE REGISTRATION HAD BEEN EXPIRED SINCE 3 OF '96. 
Q 
A 
AND WHAT DID YOU DO BASED ON THAT? 
AFTER THE LIGHT TURNED GREEN I CONDUCTED A 
TRAFFIC STOP. THE VEHICLE PULLED INTO THE PARKING LOT OF THE 
MILLION DOLLAR SALOON AT APPROXIMATELY 3400 SOUTH AND STATE. 
Q 
VEHICLE? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
WEARING? 
A 
CAMEL LOGO 
DID YOU MAKE CONTACT WITH THE DRIVER OF THE 
I DID. 
IS THAT PERSON IN THE COURTROOM? 
HE IS. 
CAN YOU POINT TO HIM AND DESCRIBE WHAT HE'S 
MR. CLIFFORD; WEARING THE BLACK T-SHIRT WITH THE 
AND THE KNEE BRACE. 
MS. MANN: THE RECORD REFLECT IDENTIFICATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT? 
THE COURT: HE HAS IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 1 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
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1 Q (BY MS. MANN) AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING. DID YOU 
2 SAY TO THE DEFENDANT UPON CONTACT? 
3 A UH, WHEN I FIRST MADE CONTACT I ASKED HIM FOR HIS 
4 DRIVER'S LICENSE, REGISTRATION, AND THEN ASKED HIM IF HE 
5 HAD -- IF HE KNEW WHY I PULLED HIM OVER. AND HE STATED: YES, 
6 IT WAS PROBABLY FOR HIS EXPIRED REGISTRATION. 
7 Q DID HE GIVE YOU THOSE THINGS YOU ASKED FOR? 
8 A HE DID. 
9 Q AND WHAT DID YOU OBSERVE ABOUT THOSE THINGS? 
10 A UH, THE PICTURE ON THE DRIVER'S LICENSE DID MATCH 
11 THE DEFENDANT AS BEING MR. CLIFFORD. UH, THE REGISTRATION DID 
12 SHOW THAT IT EXPIRED 3 OF '96. UH, ALSO HE COULDN'T PRODUCE 
13 AN UPDATED INSURANCE CARD FOR THE VEHICLE. 
14 Q AND HOW DID YOU RESPOND TO THAT INFORMATION? 
15 A UH, AFTER I GATHERED THE INFORMATION I ADVISED 
16 MR. CLIFFORD THAT'S -- IS INDEED WHY THE REASON I PULLED HIM 
17 OVER WAS FOR THE EXPIRED REGISTRATION. I ASKED HIM TO STAY 
18 WITH THE VEHICLE. THERE WAS ONE OTHER PASSENGER INSIDE THE 
19 VEHICLE. UH, I SMELLED ALCOHOL, ASKED HIM IF HE HAD BEEN 
20 DRINKING. STATED HE'D HAD A COUPLE DRINKS. I THEN RESPONDED 
21 BACK TO MY PATROL VEHICLE. 
22 Q SO WHAT DID YOU DO, UM, AFTER YOU RETURNED TO 
23 YOUR PATROL VEHICLE? 
24 A I RAN A DRIVER'S LICENSE AND WARRANTS CHECKS AND 
25 A REGISTRATION CHECK ON THE VEHICLE TO MAKE SURE THAT INDEED 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC, 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
1 IT -- IT DID EXPIRE IN 3 OF '96. 
2 Q AND WHAT WAS THE DISPATCH REPORT ON THAT? 
3 A IT HAD EXPIRED 3 OF '96, AND MR. CLIFFORD'S 
4 DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS VALID, AND HE HAD NO WARRANTS FOR HIS 
5 ARREST. 
6 Q OKAY. SO WHAT DID YOU DO AT THAT POINT? 
7 A I WENT BACK UP AND MADE CONTACT WITH MR. CLIFFORD 
8 AT -- AND ADVISED HIM OF THE TWO, UH, CHARGES -- WHICH WOULD 
9 BE EXPIRED REGISTRATION, NO PROOF OF INSURANCE -- AND ADVISED 
10 HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE A 6-SERIES UNIT, WHICH WAS A -- WOULD 
11 BE A MOTORS OFFICER GUY, BY IN A FEW MINUTES TO CONDUCT FIELD 
12 SOBRIETIES ON HIM. 
13 Q AND DID SOMEONE COME BY? 
14 A THEY DID. 
15 Q WHO WAS THAT? 
16 A DEPUTY BRENT ATKINSON. 
17 Q AND WHAT DID -- BRENT ATKINSON? --
18 A YES. 
19 Q -- DO WHEN HE ARRIVED? 
20 A HE, UH, HAD MR. CLIFFORD PERFORM SOME FIELD 
21 SOBRIETY TESTS, DETERMINED THAT HE WAS SAFE TO BE DRIVING A 
22 MOTOR VEHICLE, AND THEN ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO BE 
23 ARRESTING HIM FOR DUI. 
24 Q OKAY. SO HOW DID YOU, UM, DEAL WITH THE SITUA-
25 TION AT THAT POINT? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
1 A MR. CLIFFORD WAS ISSUED A CITATION FOR THE 
2 EXPIRED REGISTRATION AND NO PROOF OF INSURANCE, AND I ADVISED 
3 HIM THAT WE WOULD BE TOWING HIS VEHICLE FOR EXPIRED REGISTRA-
4 TION, STATE TAX. 
5 Q OKAY. AND HOW DID YOU GO ABOUT DOING THAT? 
6 A UM, MR. CLIFFORD WAS ALREADY OUT OF THE VEHICLE 
7 CAUSE HE'D JUST GOT DONE PERFORMING FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. UH, 
8 I ADVISED HIM THAT HE WOULD BE RELEASING HIS CAR TO US BECAUSE 
9 OF THE STATE TAX IMPOUND. I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD SIT ON THE 
10 WALL -- THERE'S A LITTLE CONCRETE WALL IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 
11 PARKING LOT -- HE SAT ON THE WALL. 
12 I THEN ASKED THE DRI -- OR THE PASSENGER IF HE 
13 WOULD STEP OUT OF THE VEHICLE, AND HE STEPPED OUT ALSO AND WAS 
14 PADDED DOWN FOR WEAPONS. AND THEN I CONDUCTED AN INVENTORY 
15 SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE. 
16 Q OKAY. 
17 A BEGAN TO. 
18 Q DID YOU YOURSELF CONDUCT THIS INVENTORY SEARCH? 
19 A I DID. 
20 Q OKAY. 
21 MS. MANN: YOUR HONOR, MAY I APPROACH? 
22 THE COURT: SURE. 
23 MS. MANN: MAY I HAVE THIS MARKED AS STATE'S 
24 EXHIBIT NO. 1? 
2 5 (STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
1 Q (BY MS. MANH) DO YOU RECOGNIZE WHAT'S BEEN 
2 MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1? 
3 A I DO. 
4 Q WHAT IS THAT? 
5 A IT'S A STATE TAX IMPOUND FORM SIGNED BY MYSELF. 
6 Q DID YOU FILL THAT OUT? 
7 A I DID. 
8 Q DID YOU FILL OUT THE ENTIRE FORM? 
9 A I DID NOT. 
10 Q OKAY. CAN YOU, UM, EXPLAIN WHY IT IS YOU FILL 
11 OUT SUCH A FORM? 
12 A WE DO AN INVENTORY SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE TO 
13 MAINTAIN THAT ALL PROPERTY INSIDE THE VEHICLE'S NOT DISTURBED 
14 OR TAKEN OUT OR MISSING AFTER THE, UH -- THE DEFENDANT PICKS 
15 UP HIS VEHICLE WHEN HE RECOVERS IT. 
16 Q OKAY. AND WHY IS THIS FORM NOT FILLED OUT 
17 COMPLETELY BY YOU? 
18 A UM, I STARTED THE INITIAL SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE 
19 FOR INVENTORY PURPOSES, AND THEN ONCE SOME EVIDENCE WAS FOUND, 
20 PLACED MR. CLIFFORD UNDER ARREST AND WHAT PROPERTY I HAD NOT 
21 ALREADY SEARCHED, UH, I WAS ON MY WAY TO JAIL AND DEPUTY 
22 ROMERO FINISHED IT UP AND WROTE IN ON A COUPLE LINES. 
23 Q OKAY. LET'S GO BACK THEN TO HOW YOU BEGAN YOUR 
24 SEARCH. WHAT'S THE FIRST THING YOU DID? 
25 A UH, FIRST PORTION OF THE VEHICLE I SEARCHED WAS 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
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1 THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT OF THE VEHICLE. UM. THERE WAS 
2 APPROXIMATELY THREE OPEN BEERS LOCATED IN THE PASSENGER 
3 FLOORBOARD. AFTER I SEARCHED THE PASSENGER'S SIDE I WENT OVER 
4 TO THE DRIVER'S SIDE AND BEGAN SEARCHING THE DRIVER'S SIDE. 
5 Q DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THERE? 
6 A I DID. 
7 Q AND WHAT WAS THAT? 
8 A LOCATED IN THE ARM PORTION OF THE VEHICLE WHERE 
9 THE DOOR OPENS THERE'S A LITTLE POUCH DOWN AT THE BOTTOM OF 
10 THE DOOR. AT THIS TIME I OBSERVED A BROWN LEATHER GUN 
11 HOLDER -- OR HOLSTER. 
12 Q WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THAT? 
13 A UH, AT THAT TIME IT APPEARED THAT A WEAPON WAS 
14 INSIDE OF IT. AT THAT TIME I ADVISED THE OTHER UNITS -- WHICH 
15 WOULD BE DEPUTY ROMERO AND DEPUTY BRENT ATKINSON -- THAT THERE 
16 WAS A -- I SAID 10-88 WHICH IS OUR CODE THAT THERE'S A WEAPON 
17 FOUND. 
18 ONCE I ADVISED THEM THAT THERE WAS A WEAPON IN 
19 THE VEHICLE, THEY WERE ALERTED, AND I PULLED THE WEAPON OUT. 
20 AND MR. CLIFFORD THEN STATED THAT: YES; THAT THE WEAPON WAS 
21 HIS, SPONTANEOUSLY, AND THAT THE WEAPON WAS A -- A LOCKED AND 
22 COCKED SPRINGFIELD .45 AND TO BE VERY CAREFUL CAUSE THERE WAS 
23 A BULLET IN THE CHAMBER. 
24 Q WHAT DOES THAT MEAN TO YOU WHEN SOMEONE SAYS THAT 
25 THE GUN IS LOCKED AND COCKED? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
11 
1 A UM, THERE'S ONLY ONE GUN THAT I KNOW OF WHICH 
2 WOULD BE A COLT 1911 OR SPRINGFIELD MODEL WHICH IS A REPLICA 
3 OF A COLT 1911; MEANS THAT THE -- THE HAMMER ON THE GUN IS 
4 COCKED BACK AND THAT THERE'S A WEAP- -- OR A ROUND IN THE 
5 CHAMBER, WHICH MEANS IT'S READY TO SHOOT. 
6 Q OKAY. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: AND THE SAFETY'S (INAUDIBLE). 
8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: SHHH. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: I'M SORRY. 
10 Q (BY MS. MANN) HOW MANY ACTIONS, UM, WOULD IT 
11 TAKE TO FIRE THAT WEAPON FROM THIS POINT? 
12 A ONE. 
13 Q AND WHAT IS THAT? 
14 A UH, YOU WOULD HAVE TO -- IF -- IF THE THUMB 
15 SAFETY IS ON, YOU WOULD HAVE TO RELEASE THE THUMB SAFETY AND 
16 PULL THE TRIGGER. THAT'S IT. 
17 Q OKAY. UM, WHAT IS THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
18 POLICY FOR A STATE TAX IMPOUND? WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE UNDER 
19 THE POLICY AS YOU UNDERSTAND IT? 
20 MR. NIELSEN: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT. 
21 I DON'T THINK THIS OFFICER CAN TESTIFY AS TO THE DEPARTMENT'S 
22 PROCEDURE, AND THAT'S BECAUSE UNDER RULE 1002 OF THE RULES OF 
23 EVIDENCE -- KNOWN AS THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE -- IF THEIR -- THE 
24 STATE IS ATTEMPTING TO OFFER THE CONTENTS OF A WRITING, THEY 
25 MUST PRODUCE THAT WRITING ITSELF. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
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1 SHE'S ASKING THE OFFICER TO TESTIFY AS TO THEIR 
2 WRITTEN PRE - -- PROCEDURE OR POLICY THEY NEED TO --
3 THE COURT: HOW DO WE KNOW IT'S WRITTEN? 
4 MR. NIELSEN: THEY NEED TO INTRODUCE THAT 
5 WRITTEN POLICY OR PROCEDURE. 
6 THE COURT: HOW DO WE KNOW IT'S WRITTEN? 
7 MR. NIELSEN: WE DON'T. 
8 THE COURT: SO CLEARLY --
9 MR. NIELSEN: BUT SHE ASKED HIM --
10 THE COURT: CLEARLY THERE'S NO BEST EVIDENCE. 
11 MR. NIELSEN: SHE ASKED HIM TO DESCRIBE THE 
12 POLICIES (INAUDIBLE) --
13 THE COURT: EXACTLY. 
14 MR. NIELSEN: -- PROCEDURE. 
15 THE COURT: AND YOU'RE SAYING IF IT'S WRITTEN 
16 IT'S GOT TO COME IN, AND I DON'T HAVE ANY EVIDENCE AT ALL THAT 
17 IT'S WRITTEN. 
18 MR. NIELSEN: THEN CAN I VOIR DIRE THIS WITNESS 
19 (INAUDIBLE)? 
20 THE COURT: IF YOU WANT. 
21 MR. NIELSEN: OKAY. 
22 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. NIELSEN: 
24 Q DOES THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT HAVE A WRITTEN 
25 POLICY OR PROCEDURE? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
13 
1 A THEY DO. 
2 Q FOR SEARCH AND SEIZURE? 
3 A THEY DO. 
4 Q AND WERE YOU ACTING PURSUANT TO THAT POLICY AND 
5 PROCEDURE? 
6 A I WAS. 
7 MR. NIELSEN: OKAY. 
8 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT --
9 MR. NIELSEN: (INAUDIBLE.) 
10 THE COURT: -- AND SO YOUR OBJECTION IS WHAT? 
11 MR. NIELSEN: THAT THEY HAVE TO INTRODUCE THE 
12 WRITTEN POLICY OR THEIR PROCEDURE ON INVENTORY SEARCHES INTO 
13 EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT HE FOLLOWED THEM. OR WHAT THE 
14 PROCEDURE IS, EXCUSE ME. 
15 THE COURT: INTERESTING THOUGHT. 
16 YOUR TURN. 
17 MS. MANN: YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE THAT HE HAS 
18 BEEN TRAINED IN SUCH. IF YOU -- IF I MAY, I'LL LAY SOME 
19 FOUNDATION FOR THAT. 
20 THE COURT: SO YOU THINK THIS IS RULE 10,002 OR 
21 SOMETHING? 
22 MR. NIELSEN: 1002. 
2 3 THE COURT: 1002. 
24 AND, UH, YOU THINK YOU CAN CREATE SOME FOUNDATION 
25 FOR IT? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 MS. MANN: YOUR HONOR. I WOULD ASK TO LAY A 
2 FOUNDATION BY ASKING THE OFFICER IF HE'S BEEN TRAINED BY THESE 
3 POLICIES AND WHAT HIS TRAINING WAS; WHAT IT WAS THAT HE WAS 
4 TAUGHT TO DO. 
5 THE COURT: SO YOU'RE NOT GOING TO WORRY ABOUT 
6 WHAT THE POLICY IS, BUT YOU'RE GOING TO ASK HIM WHAT HE WAS 
7 TRAINED TO DO? 
8 MS. MANN: RIGHT; HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
9 POLICY. 
10 THE COURT: AND WOULD YOU OBJECT TO THAT, MR. 
11 NIELSEN? 
12 MR. NIELSEN: I WOULD. CAUSE HIS UNDERSTANDING 
13 OF THE POLICY IS WHAT THE POLICY SAYS, AND I THINK THE BEST 
14 EVIDENCE OF THAT IS IS THE POLICY ITSELF. 
15 THE COURT: WELL, CLEARLY. YEAH. HIS UNDER-
16 STANDING WOULDN'T BE WHAT IT SAYS; IT WOULD BE HIS UNDERSTAND-
17 ING. SO WE'LL GO AHEAD AND LET HIM TESTIFY AS TO WHAT HIS 
18 UNDERSTANDING IS. 
19 MS. MANN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
20 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 
21 BY MS. MANN: 
22 Q DEPUTY BLANTON, HAVE YOU BEEN TRAINED IN THE 
23 SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR STATE 
24 IM- -- TAX IMPOUND? 
2 5 A YES, I HAVE. 
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1 Q AND WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING? CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE 
2 TRAINING? 
3 A UH, EVERY YEAR WE HAVE MANDATORY SEARCH AND 
4 SEIZURE CLASSES THAT ARE APPROXIMATELY FOUR HOURS LONG. 
5 Q AND WHAT DO THEY TEACH IN THOSE CLASSES REGARDING 
6 THE IMPOUND? 
7 A UH, THEY GIVE YOU KNOWLEDGE ON WHEN YOU CAN 
8 IMPOUND, WHEN YOU CANNOT IMPOUND, FOR EXPIRED REGISTRATION, 
9 VEHICLE THEFT AND SUCH. 
10 Q DO THEY -- OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN TAUGHT HOW TO GO 
11 ABOUT DOING A STATE TAX IMPOUND? 
12 A I HAVE. 
13 Q AND WHAT WERE YOU TAUGHT? 
14 A UH, I WAS TAUGHT IF THE VEHICLE HAS EXPIRED MORE 
15 THAN THREE MONTHS THEN WE CAN IMPOUND THE VEHICLE FOR STATE 
16 TAX REASONS. 
17 Q AND WERE YOU TAUGHT HOW TO GO ABOUT DOING THAT? 
18 A I WAS. 
19 Q AND HOW WERE YOU TAUGHT? 
20 A UH, TO ADVISE THE -- THE DEFENDANT OR THE PERSON 
21 WHO — WHO IS OPERATING THE VEHICLE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOUNDED 
22 STATE TAX FOR THE EXPIRED REGISTRATION OR WHAT OTHER REASON 
23 YOU'RE GOING TO BE IMPOUNDING IT. UH, AND THEN BEGIN YOUR 
24 INVENTORY SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE. 
25 Q UM, LET'S GO BACK TO THE POINT WHERE YOU'RE 
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1 SEARCHING THE VEHICLE. WHAT DID YOU DO WHEN YOU LOCATED THIS 
2 WEAPON? 
3 A UH, I ADVISED THE OTHER OFFICERS, FOR SAFETY 
4 REASONS, THAT THERE WAS A WEAPON FOUND INSIDE THE VEHICLE --
5 Q AND --
6 A --IN CASE THERE WAS ANY OTHERS OUTSTANDING. 
7 Q AND THEN WHAT DID YOU DO? 
8 A UH, AT THAT TIME MR. CLIFFORD SPONTANEOUSLY 
9 STATED THAT THE WEAPON WAS HIS, AND HE GAVE THE INFORMATION 
10 THAT IT WAS LOCKED AND COCKED AND TO BE CAREFUL WITH IT CAUSE 
11 THERE WAS A -- A ROUND INSIDE THE CHAMBER. AND I ADVISED HIM 
12 THAT I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE WEAPON CAUSE I HAD USED IT FOR 
13 FOUR YEARS IN THE MILITARY. 
14 Q OKAY. AND THEN WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER THAT? 
15 A I TOOK THE WEAPON OUT OF THE ARMREST OF THE 
16 VEHICLE, TOOK THE WEAPON OUT OF THE HOLSTER AND DISARMED THE 
17 WEAPON TO MAKE SURE IT WAS SAFE TO BE HANDLED. 
18 Q OKAY. AND DID YOU STAY WITH THE VEHICLE OR WHAT 
19 DID YOU DO AT THIS POINT? 
20 A AT THAT TIME I WENT OVER AND PUT MR. CLIFFORD 
21 UNDER ARREST, PLACED HIM INTO CUFFS FOR THE LOADED WEAPON AND 
22 ADVISED HIM THAT HE WAS UNDER ARREST FOR POSSESSION OF A 
23 CONCEALED LOADED WEAPON. 
24 Q OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU DO? 
25 A AFTER THAT, UM, I TOOK MR. CLIFFORD, I PLACED HIM 
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1 INSIDE MY PATROL VEHICLE AND SEAT-BELTED HIM IN, AND THEN 
2 DEPUTY ROMERO COMPLETED THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE. 
3 J Q AND WERE YOU PRESENT WHEN DEPUTY ROMERO COMPLETED 
4 THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE? 
5 A I -- I'M NOT SURE IF I WAS SITTING IN MY VEHICLE 
6 OR ON THE WAY TO JAIL. 
7 Q OKAY. SO YOU'RE NOT EXACTLY SURE WHAT HAPPENED 
8 AFTER THAT? 
9 A NO. 
10 Q UP TO THE POINT THAT YOU FOUND THE WEAPON, WERE 
11 YOU THE ONLY PERSON CONDUCTING THE IMPOUND SEARCH OF THE 
12 VEHICLE? 
13 A I WAS. 
14 Q OKAY. 
15 MS. MANN: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
16 THE COURT: MR. NIELSEN? 
17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YOU DIDN'T OFFER THAT 
18 INTO EVIDENCE. 
19 I MS. MANN: OH. 
20 YOUR HONOR, WE'D OFFER STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTO 
21 EVIDENCE. 
22 THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
23 MR. NIELSEN: YOUR HONOR, I DO. 
24 AS OFFICER BLANTON DESCRIBED, HE DIDN'T PREPARE 
25 THE WHOLE THING. I DON'T THINK THERE'S SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION 
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1 FOR THE PAR- -- PORTIONS -- EXCUSE ME -- HE DID NOT PREPARE. 
2 UM, I BELIEVE (INAUDIBLE) --
3 THE COURT: SO CAN WE JUST RECEIVE IT FOR THE 
4 PORTIONS HE PREPARED? IS THAT SUFFICIENT (INAUDIBLE) --
5 MR. NIELSEN: WELL, I WOULD HATE THE COURT TO 
6 SEE THE PARTS THAT (INAUDIBLE) --
7 THE COURT: I PROBABLY WOULDN'T EVEN LOOK AT 
8 IT. 
9 MR. NIELSEN: IF THERE'S SOME WAY WE COULD 
10 REDACT THEM THEN THAT WOULD BE FINE. 
11 THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, HOW ABOUT IF WE JUST 
12 NOT EVEN --
13 MR. NIELSEN: IF THE STATE WOULD LIKE TO 
14 SCRIBBLE THOSE --
15 THE COURT: WHY DO WE -- WHY DO WE NOT EVEN --
16 EVEN ACCEPT IT? I MEAN, WE -- WE GOT THE TESTIMONY, RIGHT? 
17 GUESS HE LOOKED. HE WAS PREPARING SOMETHING, AND HE STOPPED 
18 WHEN HE FOUND THIS LOADED GUN. 
19 IS THAT ESSENTIALLY WHAT WE HAVE? 
20 MS. MANN: I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT THAT HE DID 
21 FILL OUT THE STATE TAX INFORM -- THE STATE TAX IMPOUND, UM, 
22 PAPERWORK. BUT I DON'T THINK IT'S IMPORTANT WHAT'S ON THE 
23 PAPERWORK, SO THE COURT --
24 THE COURT: RIGHT. 
2 5 MS. MANN: -- DOESN'T NECESSARILY HAVE TO SEE 
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IT. JUST THE FACT THAT HE DID IT --
THE COURT: SO HE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF FILLING 
THIS OUT AND SOMEONE TAKES OVER FOR HIM. 
MS. MANN: YEAH, THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: I THINK THAT'S WHERE I AM ON THIS 
SO . . . 
MR. NIELSEN: OKAY. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NIELSEN: 
Q NOW THE SOLE REASON YOU STOPPED THIS VEHICLE WAS 
FOR EXPIRED REGISTRATION. 
A CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. AND IN TALKING WITH -- TALKING WITH MR. 
CLIFFORD YOU REALIZED OR NOTICED AN ODOR OF ALCOHOL ON HIS 
BREATH. 
A CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. AND AT THIS POINT YOU BELIEVED THAT MR. 
CLIFFORD WAS INTOXICATED. 
A POSSIBLY COULD BE INTOXICATED. 
Q OKAY. SO YOU CALLED FOR A BACKUP UNIT TO DO 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. 
A IT -- NOT NECESSARILY. WASN'T A BACKUP UNIT. IT 
WAS A 6-SERIES UNIT. THEY WERE OUT DOING DUI'S THAT NIGHT. 
Q SO YOU CALLED FOR ANOTHER UNIT TO DO --
A CORRECT. 
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1 Q -- FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. OKAY. 
2 AND YOU WERE PRESENT WHEN MR. CLIFFORD PASSED 
3 THESE TESTS? 
4 A I WAS. 
5 Q OKAY. SO THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR YOU TO 
6 ARREST MR. CLIFFORD FOR A DUI. 
7 A NO. 
8 Q OKAY. SO YOU, HOWEVER, STILL BELIEVED THAT MR. 
9 CLIFFORD MIGHT BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF SOMETHING. 
10 I A NO. 
11 Q IT COMPLETELY DISPELLED YOUR SUSPICION OF ANY 
12 INTOXICATION AFTER HE HAD COMPLETED THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. 
13 A NO. 
14 Q SO YOU WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT HE MAYBE WAS INTOX-
15 ICATED OR INVOLVED IN SOMETHING ILLEGAL. 
16 A NOT TO THE POINT WHERE HE WOULD BE IMPAIRED IN 
17 HIS DRIVING, NO. 
18 Q HOW ABOUT THE FACT THAT HE WAS ENGAGED IN SOME 
19 TYPE OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY? 
20 A UH, ALCOHOL, YES. 
21 Q OKAY. NOW YOU GAVE MR. CLIFFORD A TICKET FOR NO 
22 REGISTRATION. NO INSURANCE (INAUDIBLE). 
23 A NO PROOF OF INSURANCE, YES. 
24 Q AND HE WAS NOT PLACED UNDER ARREST FOR THOSE 
25 VIOLATIONS. 
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A 
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CLIFFORE 
A 
IMPOUND 
STRATION 
Q 
A 
Q 
IMPOUND 
A 
Q 
SHERIFF, 
EXPIRED 
A 
Q 
EXPIRED 
A 
Q 
NO. HE WAS RELEASED ON CITATION FOR THOSE. 
AND YOU AT THIS POINT THEN DECIDED TO IMPOUND MR. 
)'S VEHICLE. 
UH, NOT AT THIS POINT. IT WAS MY INTENTION TO 
THE VEHICLE FOR STATE TAX REASONS FOR EXPIRED REGI-
r. 
OKAY. SO YOU IMPOUNDED THE VEHICLE. 
I BEGAN AN INVENTORY SEARCH TO IMPOUND IT, YES. 
OKAY. NOW IT'S NOT A COMMON PRACTICE OF YOURS TO 
VEHICLES WITH EXPIRED REGISTRATION. 
IT IS. 
SO YOU -- IN THE THREE YEARS YOU'VE BEEN A DEPUTY 
YOU'VE IMPOUNDED EVERY VEHICLE YOU'VE STOPPED FOR 
REGISTRATION. 
NO. 
WHAT PERCENT OF THE VEHICLES YOU'VE STOPPED FOR 
REGISTRATION HAVE YOU ENDED UP IMPOUNDING? 
IT DEPENDS ON HOW FAR THEY'RE OVER-EXPIRED. 
FOR THOSE VEHICLES YOU'VE STOPPED FOR AN EXPIRED 
REGISTRATION, HOW MANY OF THOSE HAVE YOU IMPOUNDED? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
UM, APPROXIMATELY AN EIGHTH. 
ONE-EIGHTH? 
YES. 
SO TWENTY PERCENT OF THE VEHICLES YOU IMPOUNDED. 
YES. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
22 
1 THE COURT: NO, SIXTEEN. 
2 MR. NIELSEN: SIXTEEN, EXCUSE ME. 
3 THE COURT: SIXTEEN AND TWO-THIRDS, ISN'T IT? 
4 I CAN'T REMEMBER --
5 MR. NIELSEN: SIXTEEN. 
6 THE COURT: -- WHAT THE NUMBERS ARE. 
7 MR. NIELSEN: I HATE FRACTIONS. 
8 THE COURT: I'M WITH YOU. I ALWAYS GET STUCK. 
9 YOU'RE RIGHT. 
10 MR. NIELSEN: ONE-EIGHTH --
11 THE COURT: AROUND TWENTY PERCENT. 
12 MR. NIELSEN: AROUND TWENTY PERCENT. 
13 THE COURT: NO. AN EIGHTH WOULD BE A FIFTH --
14 OR A FIFTH WOULD BE TWENTY PERCENT. 
15 TRYING TO FIGURE THIS OUT. I DON'T WANT TO BE 
16 LOST HERE YOU KNOW. 
17 TWELVE; IT'S TWELVE. THAT'S THE --
18 MR. NIELSEN: TWELVE PERCENT. 
19 THE COURT: EIGHTY, NINETY-SIX. TWELVE AND A 
20 HALF. 
21 Q (BY MR. NIELSEN) DOES THAT SOUND RIGHT, OFFI-
22 CER? ABOUT TWELVE AND A HALF PERCENT? 
23 THE COURT: TWELVE AND A HALF. 
24 A ROUGHLY, YES. 
2 5 Q (BY MR. NIELSEN) AND WHETHER OR NOT YOU 
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1 IMPOUND A VEHICLE FOR EXPIRED REGISTRATION IS TOTALLY UP TO 
2 YOUR DISCRETION. 
3 A YES, IT IS. 
4 I Q SO THOSE TWO -- WELL, THOSE OTHER 84, 88 PERCENT 
5 YOU'VE LET GO; YOU JUST DIDN'T FEEL THE NEED TO IMPOUND THE 
6 VEHICLE. 
7 A CORRECT. 
8 Q IT'S YOUR MORE COMMON PRACTICE THEN TO JUST CITE 
9 THE DRIVER FOR NO REGISTRATION, MAYBE EXPLAIN FOR HIM HE NEEDS 
10 TO GET IT, AND LET HIM GO ON HIS WAY. 
11 A YES. 
12 Q AND IF YOU DON'T KNOW THIS, FEEL FREE TO SAY YOU 
13 DON'T KNOW, BUT WHAT PERCENT DO YOU THINK OTHER OFFICERS IN 
14 THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT IMPOUND? 
15 A I WOULD HAVE NO IDEA. 
16 Q NOW, YOU INFORMED MR. CLIFFORD THAT YOU WERE 
17 GOING TO DO AN INVENTORY SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE. 
18 A THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE IMPOUNDING IT STATE TAX 
19 FOR EXPIRED REGISTRATION, YES. (SIC) 
20 Q OKAY. NOW DID YOU ASK HIM IF THERE WAS ANYTHING 
21 IN THE VEHICLE THAT WAS VALUABLE OR ANYTHING MAYBE THAT YOU 
22 NEEDED TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO? 
23 A AT THAT TIME, NO. 
24 Q SO AFTER INFORMING MR. CLIFFORD THAT YOU WERE 
25 GOING TO DO A SEARCH FOR STATE TAX REASONS, YOU CLIMBED IN THE 
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1 FRONT SEAT OF THE VEHICLE. 
2 A THE PASSENGER PORTION FIRST, YES. 
3 Q THE PASSENGER PORTION. AND STARTED LOOKING 
4 AROUND. 
5 A I STARTED INVENTORYING THE VEHICLE. 
6 Q DID YOU GET IN THE GLOVE BOX? 
7 A UH, I DON'T RECALL IF I DID OR DIDN'T. 
8 Q DID YOU GET IN THE CONSOLE BETWEEN THE SEATS? 
9 A IT WAS A TRUCK. IT'S ONE BIG SEAT, I BELIEVE. 
10 Q DID YOU LOOK UNDER THE SEATS? 
11 A I DID. 
12 J Q OKAY. WHAT DID YOU FIND UNDER THE SEATS? 
13 A IN THE PASSENGER FLOORBOARD I FOUND THREE BEERS. 
14 Q DID YOU WRITE DOWN ANYWHERE THAT YOU'D FOUND 
15 THOSE THREE BEERS? 
16 A I DID. IT'S IN MY REPORT THAT THERE WERE THREE 
17 BEERS LOCATED. 
18 Q SO IT WAS IN YOUR POLICE REPORT THAT YOU WROTE 
19 IT. 
20 A YES. 
21 Q OKAY. DID YOU -- WHERE ELSE DID YOU SEARCH AFTER 
22 THAT? 
23 A AFTER I SEARCHED THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT OF THE 
24 TRUCK I WENT OVER TO THE DRIVER'S PORTION OF THE TRUCK. 
25 Q SO DID YOU FIND ANY OTHER ITEMS LOCATED IN THE 
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1 VEHICLE OTHER THAN THE BEER CANS AND THE GUN? 
2 A UH, NOTHING THAT WAS ILLEGAL. NO. 
3 Q DID YOU FIND SOME TAPES? 
4 A UH, I DON'T RECALL. I'D HAVE TO LOOK AT MY 
5 PAPER. 
6 Q DID YOU FIND ANY TYPE OF VIDEO CASSETTES? 
7 A I DON'T RECALL. 
8 Q OKAY. DID YOU FIND ANY TOOLS? 
9 A THERE WERE SOME TOOLS INSIDE THE VEHICLE, BUT I'M 
10 NOT SURE TO WHAT EXTENT. 
11 Q THESE TOOLS THAT YOU OBSERVED; DID YOU WRITE DOWN 
12 THEM ANYWHERE -- INVENTORY THEM? 
13 A UH, THEY WERE MARKED DOWN ON THE INVENTORY BY 
14 DEPUTY ROMERO AS MISCELLANEOUS TOOLS. NOT BY MYSELF --
15 Q DID YOU WRITE DOWN THAT YOU HAD SEEN THESE TOOLS? 
16 A NO, I DID NOT. 
17 Q OKAY. SO YOU DIDN'T LIST THAT YOU'D EVEN SEEN 
18 ANY TOOLS. 
19 A NO, I DID NOT. 
20 Q OKAY. NOW YOU'LL WEAR -- YOU'RE WELL AWARE THAT 
21 THE PURPOSE OF AN INVENTORY SEARCH IS TO SECURE A PERSON'S 
22 PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
23 A YES. 
24 Q AND ALSO MAKE A LIST OF IT SO THAT THAT PERSON 
25 CAN'T LATER COME BACK AND CLAIM THAT YOU'VE LOST IT OR STOLEN 
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1 IT. 
2 A CORRECT. 
3 Q OKAY. AND ALSO TO JUST CHECK THE VEHICLE TO MAKE 
4 SURE THERE'S NO DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTS OR DANGEROUS CONDITIONS 
5 ASSOCIATED WITH IT. 
6 A CORRECT. 
7 Q SO YOU DON'T RECALL LISTING OR FINDING ANYTHING 
8 OTHER THAN THE BEER CANS AND THE FIREARM. 
9 A CORRECT. 
10 Q AND THE TOOLS YOU RECALL SEEING, BUT YOU DIDN'T 
11 WRITE THEM DOWN. 
12 A I DID NOT INVENTORY THEM, NO. 
13 Q OKAY. SO AFTER YOU FOUND THE FIREARM, YOU QUIT 
14 LOOKING IN THE VEHICLE. 
15 A CORRECT. 
16 Q YOU DIDN'T GET IN THE BED OF THE TRUCK. 
17 A I DID NOT. 
18 Q DIDN'T LOOK UNDER THE EN- -- HOOD. 
19 A NO, I DID NOT. 
20 Q DIDN'T CLIMB BEHIND THE SEATS. 
21 A I DID NOT. 
22 Q OKAY. 
23 AFTER FINDING THIS GUN YOU SAY YOU NOTIFIED THE 
24 OTHER OFFICERS THAT YOU FOUND A WEAPON AND YOU IMMEDIATELY 
25 PLACED MR. CLIFFORD INTO CUSTODY. 
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1 A CORRECT. 
2 Q AND IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT MR. CLIFFORD WAS 
3 UNDER ARREST. 
4 A CORRECT. 
5 Q AND HE WAS NOT UNDER ARREST UNTIL THE GUN WAS 
6 FOUND. 
7 A NO. HE WAS RELEASED ON A CITATION. 
8 Q NOW, THE REASON YOU LOOKED IN THE DOOR POCKET OF 
9 THE TRUCK WHERE YOU FOUND THE GUN IS BECAUSE YOU WERE GOING TO 
10 INVENTORY THE CONTENTS IN THAT DOOR POCKET. 
11 A CORRECT. 
12 Q SO WHAT ELSE DID YOU FIND IN THERE BESIDES THE 
13 GUN? 
14 A I DID NOT LOOK ANY FURTHER. ONCE I NOTICED THE 
15 GUN STICKING OUT OF DOOR PANEL, THAT'S WHEN I IMMEDIATELY 
16 DIVERTED MY ATTENTION STRAIGHT TO THE WEAPON AND THE TWO 
17 OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLE. 
18 Q AND AFTER DIVERTING YOUR ATTENTION YOU DID NOT 
19 COME BACK AND FINISH YOUR INVENTORY. 
20 A I DID NOT. 
21 Q OKAY. 
22 AS PART OF YOUR INVENTORY OF THE VEHICLE YOU 
23 FILLED OUT PART OF A STATE TAX IMPOUND FORM. 
24 A I DID. 
25 Q DID YOU FILL OUT ANOTHER SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
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1 INVENTORY LIST? 
2 A NO. JUST THE STATE TAX PORTION THAT I FILLED 
3 OUT. 
4 Q OKAY. DO YOU EVER -- OR HAVE YOU EVER USED A 
5 SHERIFF'S OFFICE INVENTORY LIST? (INAUDIBLE) --
6 A WE HAVE THEM. I HAVE NEVER USED THEM. NO. 
7 Q YOU HAVE THEM. 
8 A OTHER THAN THE STATE TAX INFORMATION. 
9 Q YOU SAID THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE HAS THEM. 
10 A THEY HAVE PROPERTY FORMS. 
11 Q OKAY. 
12 A THOSE (SIC) --
13 Q BUT YOU HAVE NEVER USED THEM. 
14 A I HAVE NEVER USED THEM. THEY'RE MOSTLY FOR 
15 SEIZURE OF ITEMS INSIDE OF A HOUSE AND SUCH. 
16 Q SO IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT YOU DIDN'T NOTE 
17 ON A LIST EVERY ITEM THAT YOU FOUND OR SEIZED. 
18 A NO. 
19 Q DID YOU EVER HAPPEN TO NOTE ANYWHERE THE 
20 VEHICLE'S CONDITION? 
21 A IT IS ON THE STATE TAX PORTION, YES. 
22 Q AND DID YOU NOTE THAT? 
23 A I DID NOT FINISH THAT PORTION. NO. 
24 Q NOW YOUR OFFICE, THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE, HAS A 
25 STANDARDIZED POLICY ON DOING INVENTORY SEARCHES. 
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1 A IT DOES. 
2 Q AND IN THAT PROCEDURE OR POLICY IT SETS OUT 
3 SPECIFICALLY HOW TO DEAL WITH INVENTORYING THE CONTENTS. 
4 A IT DOES. 
5 Q AND HOW TO DEAL WITH OPEN OR CLOSED CONTAINERS 
6 THAT YOU MIGHT RUN ACROSS. 
7 A YES. 
8 Q OR HOW TO DEAL WITH CONTRABAND OR FIREARMS. 
9 A YES. 
10 Q AS OPPOSED TO YOUR EVERYDAY ITEMS YOU FIND IN A 
11 VEHICLE. 
12 A YES. 
13 Q OKAY. AND ALSO A PART OF THAT STANDARDIZED 
14 POLICY AND PROCEDURE; IT SAYS WHEN YOU INVENTORY A VEHICLE YOU 
15 SHOULD MAKE A WRITTEN LIST OR AN INVENTORY OF THE ITEMS YOU 
16 FIND. 
17 A IT DOES. 
18 Q OKAY. AND -- INCLUDING THE ITEMS YOU SEIZE. 
19 A CORRECT. 
20 Q BUT YOU DON'T HAVE ANY LIST WHERE IT DENOTES 
21 OR -- OR LISTS THE ITEMS YOU FOUND, SAW OR SEIZED. 
22 A I DO IN MY REPORT. YES. 
23 Q IN YOUR POLICE REPORT YOU NOTED THAT YOU'D FOUND 
24 A GUN AND SOME BEER CANS. 
25 A CORRECT. 
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Q SO AS I UNDERSTAND IT, WHEN YOU DO AN INVENTORY 
SEARCH, MOST OF IT IS LEFT UP TO YOUR DISCRETION WITHOUT A 
PROCEDURE. 
CORRECT. 
OKAY. 
THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND SUCH. 
YOU DID HOWEVER FIND A CELLULAR PHONE ON MR. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
CLIFFORD. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
IT WAS LOCATED IN HIS POCKET, YES. 
AND YOU LISTED THIS IN YOUR POLICE REPORT? 
IT IS IN MY PROPERTY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTION, YES, 
AND THAT WAS BOOKED INTO EVIDENCE? 
IT WAS. 
OKAY. ALONG WITH THE FIREARM? 
CORRECT. 
AND THE BEER CANS? 
UH, DEPUTY BRENT ATKINSON TOOK THE BEER CANS. 
OKAY. AND THE REST OF THE PROPERTY, I ASSUME, 
WAS LEFT IN THE VEHICLE. 
A I ASSUME, YES. 
MR. NIELSEN: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR 
HONOR, 
THE COURT: THANKS. 
ANYTHING ELSE, MS. --
MS. MANN: I HAVE A QUESTION. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
31 
1 THE COURT: -- MANN? 
2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
3 BY MS. MANN: 
4 Q HOW MANY MONTHS OVER WAS THIS VEHICLE PAST ITS 
5 REGISTRATION? 
6 A NINE MONTHS. 
7 Q HOW COMMON IS IT FOR YOU TO IMPOUND A VEHICLE 
8 THAT IS NINE MONTHS PAST REGISTRATION? 
9 A VERY COMMON. 
10 Q CAN YOU GIVE US A PERCENTAGE? 
11 A I'D SAY PROBABLY ABOUT 99 (INAUDIBLE). 
12 Q WHY DIDN'T YOU WRITE DOWN THE REST OF THE ITEMS 
13 IN THE VEHICLE? 
14 A AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME WHEN I INVENTORIED THE 
15 VEHICLE, OR WAS BEGINNING TO INVENTORY THE VEHICLE, THE FIRST 
16 THING THAT CAUGHT MY EYE WERE THE THREE OPEN-CONTAINERED BEER 
17 CANS LOCATED IN THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT. AT THIS TIME I'M 
18 LOOKING FOR ANY OTHER OPEN CONTAINERS OR ANY DANGEROUS 
19 WEAPONS. WHEN I WENT TO THE OTHER SIDE IS WHEN I LOCATED THE 
20 WEAPON. 
21 Q AND YOU DID WRITE THESE THINGS DOWN SOMEWHERE? 
22 A I DID. 
23 Q AND WHERE IS THAT? 
24 A UH, IN MY REPORT, UH, IT IS NOTED THAT THERE WERE 
25 THREE OPEN BEER CANS LOCATED IN THE PASSENGER COMPAR --
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1 PASSENGER FLOORBOARD OF THE VEHICLE AND WHERE THE, UH, 45 
2 CALIBER PISTOL WAS LOCATED. 
3 Q OKAY. AND THEN WHY DIDN'T YOU FINISH THE INVEN-
4 TORY? 
5 A I HAD TAKEN MR. CLIFFORD INTO CUSTODY AND IT WAS 
6 MY OBLIGATION AT THAT TIME TO, UH, MAINTAIN THAT MR. CLIFFORD 
7 WAS SAFELY IN THE CUSTODY AND SAT IN MY VEHICLE AND THAT'S --
8 ALL MY ATTENTION WAS DIVERTED TO HIM. 
9 Q TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE DID SOMEONE ELSE 
10 FINISH THE INVENTORY? 
11 A YES. 
12 Q AND DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT EXACTLY THAT PERSON 
13 DID OR WROTE DOWN? 
14 A I --
15 MR. NIELSEN: I'M GOING TO OBJECT, YOUR HONOR. 
16 THAT'S ALL HEARSAY. 
17 THE COURT: "YES" -- "YES"; YOU DO? OR, "NO": 
18 YOU DON'T? 
19 THE WITNESS: YES. 
20 MS. MANN: I -- I WON'T ASK WHAT THOSE THINGS 
21 ARE. I JUST SIMPLY WANTED TO KNOW IF YOU KNEW. 
22 THAT'S ALL THE QUESTIONS I HAVE. 
23 THE COURT: MR. NIELSEN, ANYTHING ELSE? 
24 I MR. NIELSEN: UH, NO. 
25 JUST ONE QUICK QUESTION. 
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BY 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
MR. NIELSEN; 
Q 
A 
DONE. 
CLIFFORD'S 
DEPARTMENT 
IS DRIVING 
IMPOUND 
11(01), 
THE 
YOU NEVER --
I'M SORRY ABOUT THIS. 
YOU NEVER DID AN INVENTORY OF THE GLOVE BOX? 
I DID NOT, NO. 
MR. NIELSEN: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: THANKS. DEPUTY BLANTON. YOU'RE 
ANYTHING ELSE. MS. MANN? 
MS. MANN: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING FROM YOU. MR. NIELSEN? 
MR. NIELSEN: AS WAY OF ARGUMENT OR --
THE COURT: EVIDENCE. 
MR. NIELSEN: EVIDENCE. NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ANY ARGUMENT. MS. MANN? 
MS. MANN: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE STATE HAS SHOWN THAT THIS VEHICLE --MR. 
VEHICLE WAS IMPOUNDED AND INVENTORIED PURSUANT TO 
POLICY. THE STATUTE READS THAT ANY TIME A PERSON 
WITH AN EXPIRED REGISTRATION, THE OFFICER MAY 
I VEHICLE. 
THE COURT: WHAT STATUTE IS THAT? 
MS. MANN: THAT WOULD BE 41-1A-11(02) --OR 
EXCUSE ME. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-0256 
34 
1 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
2 MS. MANN: STATES THAT AN OFFICER MAY IMPOUND A 
3 VEHICLE IF IT HAS AN EXPIRED REGISTRATION. 
4 DEPUTY BLANTON STATED THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD 
5 IMPOUND 99 PERCENT OF THE VEHICLES THAT HE STOPS WHO ARE NINE 
6 MONTHS OVERDUE, SUCH AS THIS VEHICLE, ON THEIR REGISTRATION. 
7 THEREFORE HE STARTED A STATE TAX IMPOUND; CLEARLY STARTED A 
8 STATE IMPAC -- THE STATE TAX IMPOUND PURSUANT TO POLICY. 
9 WHICH IS: YOU GET INTO THE VEHICLE AND LOOK FOR CONTRABAND 
10 AND WEAPONS. HE FOUND THREE OPEN CONTAINERS AND THEN HE FOUND 
11 THE GUN. 
12 AT THAT POINT HE STOPPED INVENTORYING THE VEHICLE 
13 BECAUSE THERE WAS A MORE PRESSING MATTER. AS HE EXPLAINED, IT 
14 WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO THEN GET THE GUN OUT, TAKE CARE OF 
15 THE GUN, AND THEN PLACE MR. CLIFFORD UNDER ARREST AND TAKE MR. 
16 CLIFFORD TO THE JAIL. THOSE WERE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AT THAT 
17 POINT. IT BECAME SOMEONE ELSE'S RESPONSIBILITY TO FINISH THE 
18 INVENTORY. 
19 UP TO THE POINT THAT THE GUN WAS SEIZED, DEPUTY 
20 BLANTON WAS FOLLOWING THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES AS TO STATE 
21 TAX IMPOUND. BECAUSE HE HADN'T HAD A CHANCE TO GET OUT A 
22 PIECE OF PAPER AND START WRITING THINGS DOWN DOESN'T MEAN HE 
23 WASN'T FOLLOWING POLICY AND PROCEDURE. HE WAS LOOKING FOR THE 
24 MOST IMPORTANT THINGS, OR I GUESS THE -- THE THINGS THAT THEY 
25 LOOK FOR FIRST, WHICH ARE CONTRABAND AND WEAPONS. AFTER HE 
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1 FOUND THE WEAPONS HE HAD TO STOP THE INVENTORY BECAUSE HIS 
2 RESPONSIBILITIES WERE TO THE WEAPON AND TO TAKING THE DEFEN-
3 DANT TO JAIL. 
4 I THINK CLEARLY HE WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
5 STATUTE WHICH ALLOWS A STATE TAX IMPOUND INVENTORY ALONG WITH 
6 AN EXPIRED REGISTRATION. HE WAS WORKING WITHIN HIS OWN 
7 PERSONAL POLICIES, WHICH ARE 99 PERCENT OF THE TIME TO IMPOUND 
8 OR INVENTORY A VEHICLE THAT'S NINE MONTHS OVERDUE. HE WAS 
9 WORKING WITHIN THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT POLICIES THE WAY HE 
10 WAS TAUGHT THEM WHICH IS THAT YOU BEGIN TO INVENTORY THE 
11 VEHICLE AT THAT TIME. 
12 BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO FINISH THE INVENTORY 
13 DOESN'T MAKE THIS IMPROPER. HIS DUTIES TURNED ELSEWHERE AND 
14 HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TURNED ELSEWHERE AS SOON AS HE FOUND THE 
15 GUN. UP TO THE POINT THAT HE FOL- -- FOUND THE GUN HE WAS 
16 FOLLOWING THE CORRECT PROCEDURES. 
17 WHETHER OR NOT THE VEHICLE WAS INVENTORIED 
18 CORRECTLY AFTER THAT POINT IS IRRELEVANT. THE POINT THAT HE 
19 FOUND THE GUN IS WHEN HE ARRESTS MR. CLIFFORD FOR THE GUN, AND 
20 UP TO THAT POINT HE WAS CLEARLY FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE. WHAT 
21 HAPPENED AFTER THAT POINT IS IRRELEVANT BECAUSE THE GUN HAD 
22 BEEN FOUND AND SEIZED AT THAT POINT. 
23 THE COURT: MR. NIELSEN? 
24 MR. HIELSEM: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE HAS THE 
25 BURDEN TO PROVE THAT A PROPER INVENTORY SEARCH WAS DONE, AND 
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1 THEY ARE CORRECT IN CITING THAT STATUTE THAT A VEHICLE MAY BE 
2 IMPOUNDED BY AN OFFICER WHEN THE REGISTRATION IS EXPIRED. IF 
3 THE COURT REVIEWS THAT YOU'LL FIND THAT THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT 
4 IN THERE FOR HOW PAST EXPIRATION THEY MUST IMPOUND. IT SAYS 
5 IF ANY VEHICLE IS -- HAS EXPIRED REGISTRATION THE OFFICER MAY 
6 IMPOUND THAT VEHICLE. SO WE WOULD ASSUME THAT COULD EVEN BE 
7 ONE DAY AFTER IT HAD EXPIRED. 
8 THE NEXT THING THE CASE LAW SETS OUT IS THAT IT'S 
9 THE STATE'S BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE STANDAR-
10 DIZED POLICY SET UP BY THE DEPARTMENT THAT ALLOWS FOR INVEN-
11 TORIES -- INVENTORY SEARCHES AND THAT THAT DEPUTY OR OFFICER 
12 IN THIS SITUATION FOLLOWED THOSE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AS 
13 SET OUT BY THE DEPARTMENT. 
14 I THINK THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DO THAT IN THAT 
15 THEY HASN'T -- HAVEN'T FULLY ESTABLISHED THE DEPARTMENT'S 
16 POLICY ON INVENTORY SEARCHES. THROUGH CROSS-EXAMINATION WE 
17 GOT TO IT THAT IT DOES SET OUT HOW TO DEAL WITH CLOSED AND 
18 OPEN CONTAINERS AND WHERE TO SEARCH AND HOW TO SEARCH AND HOW 
19 TO SECURE ITEMS. AND THE OFFICER EVEN TESTIFIED HE DIDN'T 
20 FULLY SEARCH THE VEHICLE AS SET OUT IN THEIR POLICY AND PROCE-
21 DURE; THAT THE POLICY AND PROCEDURE SAYS THE WHOLE VEHICLE IS 
22 TO BE INVENTORIED. THE OFFICER LOOKED ON THE FLOORBOARD AND 
23 IN THE PASSENGER'S SIDE COMPARTMENT. HE DIDN'T CHECK THE 
24 GLOVE BOX. HE DIDN'T CHECK BEHIND THE SEAT. HE DIDN'T CHECK 
25 THE BED OF THE TRUCK. 
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1 NOW, TRUE. HE QUIT THE SEARCH ONCE HE FOUND THE 
2 GUN. THAT'S MORE EVIDENCE THAT THE ONLY REASON HE WAS LOOKING 
3 IN THIS VEHICLE IN THE FIRST PLACE WAS TO SEARCH: NOT TO DO AN 
4 INVENTORY. AN INVENTORY SEARCH IS NOT FOR INVESTIGATIVE 
5 PURPOSES. IT'S TO SECURE A PERSON'S PROPERTY AND PREVENT 
6 SOMEONE FROM BEING INJURED; NOT TO RUMMAGE AROUND AND SEE IF 
7 YOU CAN FIND ANY INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE. 
8 AND IT'S CLEARLY EVIDENT BY WHAT THIS OFFICER DID 
9 THAT THAT WAS HIS PURPOSE. HE FOUND THE GUN. NOW. RIGHT, HE 
10 HAD TO TAKE MEASURES TO SECURE MR. CLIFFORD. HE -- THERE WAS 
11 OTHER DEPUTIES THERE. HE COULD HAVE PLACED HIM IN THEIR 
12 VEHICLE AND CONTINUED ON WITH HIS SEARCH AND INVENTORYING OF 
13 THE VEHICLE. 
14 THIS IS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS JUST 
15 RUMMAGING AROUND LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT BE INCRIMINA-
16 TING TO MR. CLIFFORD IN THAT HE DID NOT LIST ALL THE ITEMS 
17 THAT HE FOUND. HE NOTED THE GUN AND THE BEER CANS IN HIS 
18 POLICE REPORT. HE DIDN'T WRITE THEM DOWN IN THE SHERIFF'S 
19 DEPARTMENT INVENTORY LIST. HE DIDN'T WRITE IT DOWN ON THE 
20 STATE IMPAC- -- TAX IMPOUND LIST. 
21 AND HE SAID HE ALSO NOTICED SOME TOOLS. WELL, IF 
22 HE WAS DOING A TRUE INVENTORY OF A VEHICLE, HE WOULD HAVE 
23 WROTE ALL THOSE ON THE STATE IMPAC — TAX IMPOUND LIST OR THE 
24 SHERIFF'S PROPERTY LIST. HE WOULD HAVE NOTED HE FOUND THREE 
25 BEER CANS, HE WOULD HAVE NOTED HE FOUND A GUN, A HOLSTER, HE 
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1 WOULD HAVE NOTED HE FOUND TOOLS AND SET OUT WHAT TOOLS THEY --
2 WERE FOUND. TOOLS ARE EXPENSIVE, AND MR. CLIFFORD COMES BACK 
3 AT A LATER DATE AND SAYS, "HEY, MY TOOLS ARE MISSING." HOW'S 
4 THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT GOING TO PROTECT THEMSELVES? 
5 THAT'S THE REASON THEY HAVE THE PROCEDURE FOR 
6 INVENTORIES. AND WHEN I LOOKED AT THIS AND HEAR THE EVIDENCE, 
7 I THINK THIS WAS A SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE AND IT'S NOW BEING 
8 JUSTIFIED -- OR TRYING TO BE JUSTIFIED -- AS AN INVENTORY 
9 SEARCH WHEN IT CLEARLY WASN'T. 
10 IF OFFICER BLANTON COULD NOT FINISH THE INVENTORY 
11 SEARCH AND HE HAD TO HAVE ANOTHER OFFICER DO IT BECAUSE HE HAD 
12 TO TRANSPORT MR. CLIFFORD, THEN THE STATE SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT 
13 THE OTHER OFFICER HERE TODAY TO TESTIFY THAT HE CONTINUED THE 
14 INVENTORY SEARCH, HE DID IT, AND FINISHED IT ACCORDING TO 
15 PROCEDURE. AND EVEN THOUGH OFFICER BLANTON DIDN'T WRITE DOWN 
16 ALL THE ITEMS THAT -- THAT WERE FOUND OR OBSERVED IN THE 
17 VEHICLE, THAT HE WROTE ALL THOSE ITEMS DOWN SO THAT WE HAVE A 
18 COMPLETE INVENTORY. 
19 THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT OFFICER BLANTON 
20 COMPLETELY FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURES OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPART-
21 MENT. HE EVEN ADMITTED THAT IN DOING INVENTORIES IT'S UP TO 
22 HIS DISCRETION ON HOW TO PROCEED. IN ANY CASE YOU READ --
23 OPPERMAN. STRICKLING, HYDE, SCHAMBLIN -- ALL OF THEM SAY 
24 THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THEY'RE TRYING TO AVOID IS A OFFICER BEING 
25 ABLE TO GET INTO A PERSON'S VEHICLE. RUMMAGE AROUND, LOOK FOR 
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1 EVIDENCE AND SAY, "OH, IT WAS AN INVENTORY." 
2 IF THE STATE'S GOING TO CALL IT AN INVENTORY --
3 TRY TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH AS AN INVENTORY -- THEN THEY NEED TO 
4 SHOW THAT IT WAS AN INVENTORY: THAT HE INVENTORIED THE CON-
5 TENTS; THAT'S WHAT HE WAS DOING. AND BY THE FACT THAT HE QUIT 
6 THE SEARCH AFTER FINDING THE GUN -- HE DID (SIC) WRITE DOWN 
7 ALL OF THE ITEMS HE OBSERVED, AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED 
8 THAT THE SEAR INVENTORY OF THE VEHICLE AND ITS CONTENTS 
9 WAS COMPLETED IS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS NOT AN INVENTORY 
10 SEARCH, AND I THINK THIS COURT NEEDS TO SUPPRESS THE WEAPON 
11 THAT WAS FOUND IN THIS CASE. 
12 THE COURT: MS. MANN? 
13 MS. MANN: YOUR HONOR, THE ACTIONS OF THE 
14 DEPUTY OR OTHER DEPUTIES AFTER THE SEIZURE OF THE GUN CANNOT 
15 GO TO WHETHER OR NOT A GUN IS SUPPRESSED. ONCE THE GUN HAS 
16 BEEN FOUND, IT'S THE ACTIONS OF THE POLICE OFFICERS UP TO THE 
17 POINT THAT THE GUN WAS FOUND. AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A 
18 DEFICIENT INVENTORY AFTER THE GUN WAS FOUND. THE STATE HASN'T 
19 SHOWN. THE STATE DIDN'T PROVE WHETHER OR NOT AN INVENTORY WAS 
20 COMPLETED PROPERLY, BUT WE DIDN'T NEED TO BECAUSE THAT 
21 HAPPENED AFTER THE GUN WAS SEIZED. 
22 WHAT THE STATE HAS TO PROVE IS SIMPLY THAT THE 
23 ACTIONS, FROM THE TIME THE OFFICER STOPPED THE DEFENDANT UP 
24 UNTIL THE GUN WAS SEIZED, WERE APPROPRIATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL, 
25 AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THEY WERE. 
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1 DEPUTY BLANTON STOPPED DEFENDANT DUE TO A EQUIP-
2 MENT VIOLATION. THEY RAN THROUGH ALL OF THE NORMAL PROCEDURES 
3 TO FIND OUT WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING UNDER THE 
4 INFLUENCE, DETERMINED HE WAS NOT, RELEASED HIM ON THAT PARTI-
5 CULAR ISSUE, GAVE HIM A CITATION FOR THE ITEMS THAT WERE 
6 INCORRECT -- WHICH WAS THE REGISTRATION AND INSURANCE -- TOLD 
7 HIM RIGHT THERE AND THEN, "WE'RE GOING TO DO A STATE TAX 
8 IMPOUND." 
9 DEPUTY BLANTON DOES 99 PERCENT STATE TAX IMPOUNDS 
10 ON VEHICLES THAT ARE OVER NINE MONTHS OLD ON THE REGISTRATION. 
11 THEY WE- -- STARTED A STATE TAX IMPOUND. THE VERY BEGINNING 
12 I OF STATE TAX IMPOUND THE FIRST TWO THINGS THAT ARE LOCATED ARE 
13 THE OPEN CONTAINER AND THE GUN. NOW. THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE 
14 TO PROVE THAT DEPUTY BLANTON HAD A PIECE OF PAPER IN HIS HAND 
15 AND WAS WRITING DOWN EVERY ITEM THAT CAUGHT HIS EYE BEFORE HE 
16 SAW THE GUN; SIMPLY THAT HE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DOING AN 
17 INVENTORY. 
18 AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT HE'S TESTIFIED THAT HE 
19 WAS DOING. THERE'S NO REASON TO SPECULATE AS TO WHAT DEPUTY 
20 BLANTON WAS THINKING, WHEN HE SAT HERE AND TESTIFIED TO 
21 EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS DOING; EXACTLY WHAT HE HAS BEEN TRAINED TO 
22 DO AND THAT IS A STATE TAX IMPOUND PURSUANT TO AN EXPIRED 
23 REGISTRATION. GETS INTO THE VEHICLE, BEGINS THE INVENTORY. 
24 HE FINDS TWO VERY INCRIMINATING ITEMS; THE OPEN CONTAINER AND 
25 THE GUN. BEFORE HAVING TIME TO SIT DOWN AND WRITE DOWN 
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1 EVERYTHING ELSE THAT HE SAW IN THE VEHICLE HE NEEDS TO TAKE 
2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT GUN AND MAKE SURE THAT'S TAKEN CARE OF 
3 AND THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO JAIL. 
4 SO THE -- WHETHER OR NOT A FULL INVENTORY WAS 
5 DONE IS IRRELEVANT. WHAT IS RELEVANT IS WHETHER OR NOT THE 
6 OFFICER'S ACTIONS WERE CONSTITUTIONAL UP TO THE POINT THE GUN 
7 WAS FOUND, AND THEY WERE. THEY WERE ALL WITHIN THE CONSTITU-
8 TIONAL AND WITHIN THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS. HE WAS FOLLOWING 
9 HIS OWN DEPARTMENT'S GUIDELINES AND THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS, 
10 AND THE STATE WOULD ASK FOR THE EVIDENCE TO NOT BE SUPPRESSED. 
11 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
12 WELL, I THINK THE FINDINGS THAT I WOULD MAKE ARE 
13 AS FOLLOWS: THAT -- THAT CLEARLY IN THIS CASE DEPUTY BLANTON 
14 HAS A REASON TO IMPOUND THE VEHICLE. THE STATUTE'S BEEN CITED 
15 BY THE STATE WHICH ALLOWS THAT. EVIDENTLY, IF I UNDERSTOOD 
16 RIGHT, THE OFFICE POLICY OR THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT POLICY IS 
17 THAT IF IT'S THREE MONTHS PAST -- OR EXPIRED PAST THE DUE DATE 
18 THAT IT OUGHT TO BE IMPOUNDED. AND HERE WE HAVE ONE THAT WAS 
19 NINE MONTHS PAST; THE DRIVER CLEARLY KNOWING THAT HE WAS 
20 DRIVING ON AN EXPIRED REGISTRATION. SO THE OFFICER HAS THE 
21 AUTHORITY TO IMPOUND IT. 
22 THEN THE QUESTION BECOMES: IS HIS SEARCH 
23 PURSUANT TO THE IMPOUND, I GUESS, IN CONFORMANCE WITH PROPER 
24 PROCEDURES? 
25 AND DEPUTY BLANTON HAS TOLD US THAT HE BEGAN TO 
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1 FILL OUT THE FORM, HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE THREE OPEN 
2 CONTAINERS OF ALCOHOL IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE. HE -- IN THE 
3 PASSENGER COMPARTMENT. HE THEN, I GUESS, SEIZED SOME TOOLS 
4 AND THEN HE SEIZED THE GUN, LOCKED AND COCKED. 
5 I GUESS THE DEFENDANT'S POSITION -- AND I -- I 
6 DON'T WANT TO MISSTATE YOUR POSITION, MR. NIELSEN -- BUT I 
7 GUESS IT IS THAT RATHER THAN BLANTON SECURING AND TAKING THE 
8 DEFENDANT SOMEWHERE AS HE DID. THAT BLANTON OUGHT TO SECURE 
9 HIM, DO THE SEARCH AND -- AND COMPLETE THE SEARCH, AND THEN 
10 TAKE HIM SOMEWHERE OR HAVE SOMEONE ELSE TAKE HIM. I -- I 
11 DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY LAW THAT REQUIRES THESE OFFICERS TO DO 
12 IT IN A CERTAIN WAY. 
13 SO AS HE BEGAN THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE IN A 
14 PROPER MANNER AND FINDS EVIDENCE OF A CRIME -- WHICH HE DID --
15 MY FINDING IS HE BEGAN IT ACCORDING TO STATUTE AND POLICY AND 
16 HE FOUND EVIDENCE OF A CRIME AND SO HE WAS INTERRUPTED IN THE 
17 SEARCH. I DON'T THINK THAT THE STATUTES OR THE CASE LAW WOULD 
18 REQUIRE HIM TO KEEP ON SEARCHING AND IGNORE THE EVIDENCE OF 
19 THE CRIME OR DO IT IN ANOTHER FASHION OR ANOTHER ORDER. 
20 SO IT'S CLEAR TO ME THAT HIS PURPOSE IN SEARCHING 
21 WAS SIMPLY TO MAKE AN INVENTORY. AS HE WAS IMPOUNDING THE 
22 CAR, HE COMES UPON THESE ITEMS OF THE CRIME AND THEN HE MAKES 
23 THE ARREST. SO MY FINDING IS THAT THIS WAS A PROPER SEARCH 
24 PUR- -- DONE PURSUANT TO STATUTE AND POLICY, AND I WOULD DENY 
25 THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE. 
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TURN 
APPRECIATE BOTH OF YOU PARTICIPATING. I NEED TO 
YOUR (SIC) 1 
SOMEDAY OF ' 
EXTRA 
THAT. 
TRIAL 
THAT' 
YOUR 
COPY. 
IT'S 
MAYBE' 
3ACK YOUR COPY AND I HOPE WE FIND OUR COPY 
rHE MOTION SO THAT OUR FILE WILL BE 
MR. 
MS. 
MR. 
HIELSEN: YOUR HONOR -• 
MANN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
NIELSEN: -- IF -- IF I MAY, : 
(INAUDIBLE) THE COURT. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE AN EXTRA? 
PROBABLY HERE SOMEWHERE AND . . . 
FILE MR. NIELSEN'S COPY. 
AND 
? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COMPLETE. 
t HAVE AN 
I APPRECIATE 
THEN DO WE NEED A DATE FOR SOMETHING ELSE? 
NIELSEN: UM — 
COURT: JUDGE FRATTO COULD DO 
NIELSEN: YEAH. (INAUDIBLE.) 
COURT: -- SEPTEMBER THE 23RD 
S CONVENIENT FOR YOU BOTH. THAT WORK FOR 
HONOR? 
WE COULD DO 
MR. 
THE 
THAT 
(RECORDING 
NIELSEN: CAN WE SET THAT FOR 
THAT ON --
AT 1:30 IF 
YOU? 
A JURY TRIAL, 
COURT: OH. LET'S FIGURE A JURY THEN. OH. 
__ 
OF THE PROCEEDING WAS CUT OFF ) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
SS 
I, VICKI R. BOS, A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AND 
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, RESIDING AT SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I RECEIVED AND TRANS-
CRIBED THE ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED COPY OF THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS HEARING IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH VS. VERNON 
E. CLIFFORD HELD ON THE 29TH DAY OF JULY, 1997. 
THAT THE FOREGOING IS A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIP-
TION AS SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING PAGES NUMBERED FROM 3 TO 
44, INCLUSIVE, EXCEPT WHERE IT IS INDICATED THAT THE TESTIMONY 
OR PROCEEDING WAS INAUDIBLE, AND THAT THIS WAS DONE TO THE 
BEST OF MY ABILITY. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT OF KIN OR OTHERWISE 
ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE PARTIES TO SAID CAUSE OF ACTION, 
AND THAT I AM NOT INTERESTED IN THE EVENT THEREOF. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, THIS ST/n DAY OF JANUARY, 1998. 
l^cj. r£ SlLr^ 
VICKI R. BOS, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
NOVEMBER 7TH, 2000 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
VICKI R. BOS 
3640 So. 2300 E. 
S.L.C.. UT 84109 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
NOV. 7, 2000 
STATE OF UTAH 
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